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Abstract

In the first essay titled “Monthly Cyclicality in Retail Investors’ Liquidity and Lotterytype Stocks at the Turn of the Month”, we find that the well-documented underperformance of
lottery stocks masks a within-month cyclical pattern. Demand for lottery stocks increases at the
turn of the month especially in areas whose demographic profile resembles that of the typical
lottery-ticket buyers (i.e., gamblers) driving their prices higher at the turn of the month. This
effect is particularly pronounced among firms located in areas whose demographic profile
resembles that of the typical lottery-ticket buyer and propelled by the within-month cyclicality of
local investors’ personal liquidity positions. A long-short investment strategy based on this
cyclical pattern of lottery stocks performance yields gross abnormal returns of about 13% per
year.
In the second essay titled “Lottery-type Stocks and Corporate Strategies at the Turn of the
Month”, we test whether cyclical demand for lottery stocks by retail investors, that tends to peak
at the turn-of-the-month (ToM), affects firms’ financial activities. Consistent with the notion that
the peak in demand is driven by a propensity to gamble and is associated with inattention, we
find underreaction to earnings news issued at the ToM by lottery-type firms located in areas with
many gambling investors. We also find that the ToM also provides a window of opportunity for
SEO issuing lottery-type firms. Such issuing firms may strategically choose to issue lottery-type
iv

stocks at the ToM to save the direct marketing costs because it flattens the elasticity of pre-offer
demand curve.

v

Monthly Cyclicality in Retail Investors’ Liquidity and Lottery-type Stocks
at the Turn of the Month
1. Introduction
We aim at providing evidence that will enable better understanding of speculative retail
investors’ role in the pricing of a category of stocks with lottery-like features (i.e., low price and
high idiosyncratic volatility and skewness) that is known to attract their attention (Han and
Kumar, 2013). Our investigation is focused on the performance of these stocks around the turnof-the-month (hereafter, ToM) and its interplay with changes in personal liquidity affecting
individuals’ economic activity. The ToM provides a natural laboratory setting for addressing the
importance of unsophisticated retail investors in the market of lottery stocks, and whether their
presence is an indicator of predictable patterns in lottery stock performance.
Very much like state lotteries’ tickets, stocks with lottery-like features attract investors
who have strong propensity to gamble and tend to be poorer, less educated, urban, catholic, and
belong to minority groups (Kumar, 2009a). With low income and possibly limited savings, this
type of investor typically experiences a great deal of change in his or her personal liquidity
position at the turn of a calendar month: availability of investable capital tends to peak at the
beginning of the month and reach its lowest level toward the end of the month. Indeed there is
evidence that many economic activities follow a similar within-month cyclical pattern, with the
largest swing in consumption having been observed for lottery sales (Evans and Moore, 2012).
Thus, the investable capital of the typical gambling-motivated investor who likes lottery stocks is
1

also expected to reach a trough just prior to the end of a calendar month and a peak shortly
thereafter, i.e. in the first few trading days of the new calendar month. If our conjecture is correct,
the period of the peak in demand for lottery-type stocks by gambling-minded individual
investors would coincide with the well documented ToM anomaly wherein stocks tend to
perform better on trading days encompassing the change of a calendar month. Therefore, we
hypothesize that the short-term surge in stock returns at the ToM would be stronger for lotterytype stocks than for non-lottery-type stocks and more pronounced among local stocks in areas
that present a closer fit with the demographic profile of the typical lottery investor. Moreover, we
posit that the difference in performance between lottery and non-lottery stocks around the turn of
a month can be partly attributed to lottery investors’ greater susceptibility to changes in personal
liquidity that affects economic activity around the same period.
Our findings can be summarized as follows. We first document a strong positive relation
between lottery-type stocks and ToM stock returns. Lottery-type stocks significantly outperform
non lottery-type stocks by about 3 basis points per day on average after controlling for time- and
industry- fixed effects, the turn-of-week effect, and firm characteristics. We then show that the
effect is particularly pronounced among lottery stocks in areas with an abundance of local
investors that fit the lottery stock investor demographic profile, consistent with the notion that
the exaggerated ToM performance of lottery stocks is driven by investors’ desire to gamble.
We empirically confirm the link between superior ToM performance of lottery stocks and
changes in local investors’ personal liquidity positions around the time surrounding the end of a
calendar month and the beginning of the next month. This is done in two ways: first, we provide
a more direct test of the hypothesis that there is cyclicality in trading behavior of investors who
are liquidity constrained and prefer lottery-type stocks. We use household level investments data
1

from a brokerage house covering the 1991-1996 period to show that liquidity-constrained
investors buy more lottery-type stocks at the ToM. Second, inspired by Evans and Moore (2012),
we use the county-level change in mortality rate as a proxy for the change in local investors’
personal liquidity position and document it is a driver of lottery-type stocks’ ToM effect. This is
particularly true in areas with greater concentration of local investors with high propensity to
gamble on lottery-type stocks.
We account for potential criticisms associated with endogeneity and causality,
respectively. First we address the possibility that there could be some unobservable characteristic
correlated with being “lottery-type” that is affecting our results. In order to avoid problems from
endogeneity, we use stock splits and headquarters’ changes (i.e. exogenous shocks to the status
and location of firms) to devise tests that are free of identification issues. Since stock price is one
of the criteria for classifying stocks as lottery-type, the ToM effect should become stronger for
the same stock after a stock split. Indeed we show that this is the case, in particular among stocks
located in areas with many investors that fit the profile of “gamblers”.

Additionally, we

introduce an exogenous shock to firms’ exposure to gamble-minded investors and examine
companies that change headquarters to determine whether their ToM performance after
relocating is affected by the demographic characteristics of the new location. Indeed, we
document that the ToM effect becomes stronger (weaker) for lottery stocks that moved their
headquarters in (out of) an area with many lottery-type stock investors. To provide a causal link
between local liquidity constrained investors and lottery stocks’ performance at the ToM, we
examine the instances of power outages that occurred at the ToM as exogenous shocks that
constrain trading by local investors. We find that in areas with many lottery-type investors power
outages are associated with a significantly lower lottery stocks’ ToM effect.
2

In the last part of our analysis, we address the issue of whether our results can be used by
practitioners as the basis for an investment strategy. We show that an arbitrage portfolio formed
to exploit the within-month cyclicality in lottery stocks’ performance outperforms by about
0.052% per day or about 13% per year.1
Our paper follows past research showing that retail investors like to gamble and show
preference for skewness (e.g., Shefrin and Statman, 2000; Kumar, 2009a; Barberis and Huang,
2008; Dorn and Huberman, 2010), or seek sensation through trading (e.g. Grinblatt and
Kehloharju, 2009; Dorn and Sengmueller, 2009) and contributes to the literature that addresses
the importance of retail investors in the pricing of stocks (e.g. see Han and Kumar (2013)).
Specifically, we provide evidence that gambling-inclined investors’ demand during the ToM, a
period when personal liquidity constraints of such retail investors are relaxed, drives a surge of
lottery-type stock prices.
Our evidence also complements recent research that suggests that lottery preferences can
lead to destabilized stock prices (e.g. see Blau, Bowles, and Whitby (2015) or Kumar, Page, and
Spalt (2015)).We show that the demand for lottery stocks displays a monthly cyclical pattern
driven by cyclicality in personal liquidity positions of gambling-minded investors. Moreover, we
also show that it is the collective characteristics of lottery-type stocks (i.e. not just skewness, but
also high volatility and low price all together) that matter in terms of producing the patterns
shown in our results. Thus, our results are also in line with recent evidence that considering
investor preference for lottery stocks can provide explanations for anomalies, such as “betting

1

Since this strategy is focused on relatively small firms and requires extensive rebalancing it is quite likely that
gross returns could be largely extinguished by transactions costs (see Novy-Marx and Velikov (2014)). However, as
stated in Novy-Marx and Velikov (2014) net returns can be improved by adjusting trading strategy toward a smaller
number of relatively larger firms.
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against beta” (see Bali, Brown, Murray and Tang (2015)), or for abnormal investment
performance (see Frazzini, Kabiller, and Pedersen (2015)). We extend this part of the literature
by illustrating a cyclical pattern in the manifestation of lottery preferences due to liquidity
constraints. This result has potentially significant implications for corporate decisions related to
the optimal timing of disclosure and financing. For example, it is possible that savvy corporate
managers that are aware of these patterns would time announcements of bad earnings news or
announcements of secondary equity issues so as they would occur during ToM days.

2. Background and Hypotheses’ Development
Gambling is a major commercial activity that has been attracting people fascinated by
games of chance for centuries. Individuals’ propensity to gamble seems to go beyond the
occasional attempt to try out their luck by visiting a casino or by purchasing lottery tickets, and
seems to play a major role in investments decisions as well. For example, as early as 60 years
ago, Markowitz (1952) suggested that “generally people avoid symmetric bets” and certain
investors could “take large chances of a small loss for a small chance of a large gain.” In fact,
human aspirations, thoughts, and emotions are the reasons why people still trade in stocks much
like the way they buy lottery tickets even though they know it is a negative sum game (Statman,
2002). In a similar vein, Barberis and Huang (2008) show that positively skewed securities can
be ‘overpriced’ and earn negative average excess returns. Conjecturing that people’s propensity
to gamble might relate to stock market trading, Kumar (2009a) investigates the influence of
gambling attitudes on stock investment decisions and presents evidence that individual investors’
socioeconomic characteristics can affect their investment decisions. His findings suggest that
investors who are poor, young, relatively less educated, single men, who live in urban areas and
belong to specific minority (African-American and Hispanic) and religious (Catholic) groups
4

invest disproportionately more in stocks that are perceived as gambling devices because the
distribution of their payoffs resembles that of lottery tickets, i.e. lottery-type stocks. Doran et al.
(2012) provides evidence that while lottery-like options and stocks in the U.S. do not necessarily
outperform most of the year, they exhibit higher prices and returns at the start of a calendar year.
They attribute this phenomenon to the stronger gambling mentality and increased buying
activities of some market participants around the New Year holiday.
There is a considerable body of empirical evidence documenting the ToM effect, labeled
an anomaly in the literature because it clearly stands in conflict with the concept of market
efficiency. Ariel (1987) reports a cyclical pattern in value-weighted and equally weighted daily
stock index returns for the period 1963 - 1981 and names it “monthly effect”, for which he could
not provide a sufficient explanation. The pattern consists of higher mean stock returns during the
initial few days of a trading month than during days later in the month. Lakonishok and Smidt
(1988) refer to the four consecutive trading days that begin with the last trading day of a month,
as turn-of-month trading days and find strong ToM stock returns on the Dow Jones Industrial
Average index for the period 1897 – 1986. Odgen (1990) provides extra evidence and an
explanation for the ToM effect. He proposes and tests a hypothesis that the standardization in the
payments system in the United States that leads to a concentration of cash flows at the ToM
month contributes, at least in part, to the monthly and January effects. He explains that since the
liquid profit position of investors tends to be at its highest level at the turn of each calendar
month, the ensuing increase in demand leads to the surge of stock returns at the ToM. Cadsby
and Ratner (1992) also study the ToM and pre-holiday effects in international markets. They find
that the ToM effect is significant in Canada, the UK, Australia, Switzerland, and West Germany
but not significant in Japan, Hong Kong, Italy or France. They conclude that the absence of these
5

effects in certain markets suggests that they may originate from country-specific institutional
practices.
A seemingly unrelated, yet as it turns out quite relevant, strand of literature focuses on
the within-month cycle of mortality. In the United States, according to Phillips et al. (1999),
daily mortality counts fluctuate over the course of a calendar month with the number of deaths
being 1% above average in the first week of the month and 1% below average in the last week of
the preceding month. They speculate that the increased risk of death at the beginning of the
month might be associated with behavioral changes (for example, a sudden increase in substance
use) during the same period since “money to purchase drugs and alcohol tends to be available at
the beginning of the month and is relatively less available (for people with low incomes) at the
end of month.” Indeed, payments of many types of federal benefits, such as Social Security,
welfare, and military benefits, typically occur at the beginning of each month. Evans and Moore
(2012) document that a similar within-month cycle exists in people’s economic activity and
provide suggestive evidence that both mortality and economic activity within-month cycles are
linked to changes of personal liquidity over the course of the month. Particularly, people who
have low levels of wealth and financial savings (measured by education attainment) also suffer
the biggest jump in mortality at the beginning of month. Another interesting finding in their
study is that state lottery sales in both Maryland and Ohio lotteries exhibit a within-month cycle
and reach a peak in the first week of the month.
Since people who purchase state lotteries and people who invest in lottery-type stocks
share common characteristics (Kumar, 2009a), we conjecture that the demand for lottery-type
stocks tends to be the highest at the turn of month when the liquidity position of lottery-type
stock investors is at its strongest and that this short-lived price pressure effect could be the driver
6

of higher ToM returns for lottery-type stocks. Thus, our hypotheses can be summarized as
follows:
Hypothesis 1: The turn-of-month effect is more pronounced for lottery-type stocks than
for non-lottery-type stocks.
The second hypothesis is based on our conjecture that lottery type stocks’ outperformance around the ToM is not attributed to an innate characteristic of lottery stocks but
rather to the surge in demand by individuals that we argue are more likely to invest in this type
of stocks.
Hypothesis 2: The turn-of-the-month effect of lottery stocks is particularly pronounced in
firms more likely to attract individuals that prefer lottery-type investments.
The third hypothesis is designed to address the existence of a personal-liquidity
mechanism that we argue could be the driver of the lottery-type stocks’ performance around the
ToM. As discussed earlier, the typical type of individual investor that is attracted to lottery
stocks is less wealthy and less educated and consequently, more prone to drastic changes in his
or her personal liquidity position around the turn of a calendar month. As retail investors’
personal liquidity rebounds from a trough at the end of the month to a peak at the beginning of
the next month, they become more likely to lead a short-term surge in demand for lottery-type
investments.
Hypothesis 3: Lottery stocks’ propensity to display a strong turn-of-month effect is driven
by a change in the personal liquidity position of retail investors who are typically attracted to
lottery-type investments.

7

3. Data and Descriptive Statistics
3.1 Lottery-type Stocks
Our initial sample includes all stocks in the CRSP universe from 1980 to 2010. We
follow Kumar (2009a) to define and select our sample of lottery-type stocks. Kumar points out
that investors who exhibit gambling behavior in the stock market, are more likely to buy stocks
that are “cheap bets”, “occasionally generate extreme positive returns”, and whose “extreme
return events observed in the past are more likely to be repeated”. Thus, we classify lottery-type
stocks as those in the lowest 50th stock price percentile, the highest 50th idiosyncratic volatility
percentile, and the highest 50th idiosyncratic skewness percentile as lottery-type stocks. Stocks
that belong to none of those three categories are defined as “non-lottery type” stocks. The
remaining stocks in the CRSP universe are classified as “other-type”. In our final sample, there
are 5059 lottery-type stocks and 17,062 number of nonlottery-type and other-type stocks. To
indicate the status of stocks, we use a dummy variable, Lottery, which equals one if the stock is
classified as lottery-type and zero otherwise.
Stock returns, trading volume, shares outstanding, and share price information are from
the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP). Idiosyncratic volatility and idiosyncratic
skewness are measured following past papers (Kumar (2009a), Harvey and Siddique (2000), and
Ang et al. (2006)) and computed at the end of month t, based on information from a 6-month
window prior to month t (month t-6 to t-1).
3.2 Sample Selection and Variable Measurement
We follow Lakonishok and Smidt (1988) and define ToM trading days as the last trading
day of a month and first three trading days of the next month. We control for several firm
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characteristics in our regression analysis. Detailed definitions of all variables and data sources
can be found in the Appendix A. The existing body of evidence in the literature shows a weekly
anomaly in stock returns around the world: stock markets exhibit positive daily returns on
Fridays and an opposite pattern on Mondays (Dubois and Louvet, 1996). To alleviate the
concern that ToM stocks returns might be partly driven by the turn-of-week effect, we include a
dummy variable Friday in our regression, which equals one if the trading day is on a Friday and
zero otherwise. Past 12-month returns is used in regression as a control for momentum. Common
risk factors, such as Fama and French (1993) factors (MKT, SMB, HML) and the UMD factor
from Carhart (1997), are also included in the return regressions. Our analysis accounts for
several county-level variables that characterize local investors’ demographic profile as well. If
individuals exhibit local bias, i.e., tend to invest disproportionately in local ﬁrms (see, for
example, Seasholes and Zhu (2010) among many others), then local investors that fit the profile
of a lottery-type stock investor will show preference for local lottery-type stocks. According to
Kumar (2009a), the typical lottery-type stock investor is more likely to have low levels of
income and education, live in urban areas, be Catholic and belong to African-American or
Hispanic minority groups. We measure the likelihood that the average local investor fits the
profile of a lottery-type stock investor by aggregating the information of six variables into an
index, which we label as Lottery-Type Stock Local Investor index (LSLI-Index). The variables
used to construct LSLI-Index are: Urban, Catho/Prot, Education, Income, AfriWhi, and InstiOwn.
Urban is a dummy variable, which equals one if the firm's headquarter is located within 100
miles of one of the ten largest metropolitan areas of the U.S. according to the census, and zero
otherwise. We follow a number of papers, including Coval and Moskowitz (1999) and Seasholes
and Zhu (2010), and use headquarters’ locations, obtained from Compustat, as a proxy for firm
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locations.

We

use

data

from

Prof.

Bill

McDonald’s

website

(http://www3.nd.edu/~mcdonald/10K_Headers/ 10-K_Headers.html) to account for the fact that
some firms changed headquarter locations over the sample period. The data are available from
1994-2010. To capture the religiosity of investors, we obtain the religious profile data of all U.S
counties from the Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA) and calculate the ratio of
Catholics population to Protestants population (Catho/Prot) of each county in the U.S. Using the
zip code of each firm headquarter, we assign the corresponding county-level religious
characteristics to the firm. Education is the percentage of residents in a county with a Bachelor’s
or higher educational degree. AfriWhi, is defined as the number of African-Americans over the
number of White-Americans in a county. Income is the median of annual household income in a
county. The three aforementioned variables related to local demographics are constructed at the
county level from information extracted from U.S. census and assigned to all firms with
headquarters in particular counties.

We follow Bartov, et.al (2000) and use institutional

ownership (the percentage of shares held by institutions, InstiOwn) as a proxy for investor
sophistication and an indicator of a lower probability of lottery-type investors. Institutional
ownership data are from the Thomson Financial database, which consists of 13F filings reported
quarterly to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for the sample period. The LotteryType Stock Local Investor Index is thus designed as follows:
LSLI-Index =

1
[Rank(Catho/Prot)+Rank(AfrWhi)+Rank(-InstOwn)
6𝑁

1
6

+Rank(-Income)+ Rank(-Education)] + Urban

(1)

where N is the total number of observations and Rank( ) is a function that returns the rank of the
input variable. It is constructed in such a way that each of the six component variables receives
10

equal weight in the index and that counties with high concentration of lottery-type stock
investors have larger values of LSLI-Index.
Evans and Moore (2012) suggest that the within-month cycle of mortality is positively
related to that of people’s economic activity and personal liquidity over the month. Moreover,
the change in mortality at the turn of the month tends to be largest for people who have the
greatest liquidity issues (low levels of income and education). We use the county-level change
of mortality at the turn of the month to proxy the change in the personal liquidity position of
local investors in the county. Mortality data are from the Multiple Cause of Death data files
compiled by Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). As we did with all other
county-level variables, we then assign the appropriate county-level change in mortality rate to all
firms with headquarters’ zip code within a particular county.
The data selection process described in this section generates a final sample of
17,337,825 firm-trading day observations and 4,880,471 firm-ToM trading day observations over
the period 1980-2010.
3.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1.1 Panel A presents a general comparison of several stock characteristics between
lottery and all other (non-lottery and other-type) stocks. By definition, lottery-type stocks exhibit
very different characteristics than the rest of the stocks in terms of stock price, idiosyncratic
volatility and idiosyncratic skewness. Consistent with Kumar (2009a), our sample’s lottery-type
stocks are also, on average, smaller, younger, and with higher book-to-market ratio, poorer
performance, and less analyst coverage.
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Table 1.1 Panel B displays the descriptive statistics of variables used in empirical
analysis for the lottery-type subsample and for the subsample containing the rest of the stocks.
Also reported are the mean differences and corresponding t-statistics. The average daily stock
return on ToM days, our main variable of interest, is significantly higher for lottery-type stocks
(0.302%) compared to the rest of the stocks (0.210%). This is quite interesting considering the
fact that lottery-type stocks are typically poor performers (Kumar, 2009a) in the long run.
Consistent with Kumar (2009a), lottery-type stocks in our sample attract less sophisticated
investors as evidenced by their lower level of institutional ownership compared to those of the
rest of the CRSP universe. Also, firms whose stocks are categorized as lottery-type are located in
counties with greater concentration of individuals that fit the profile of the typical lottery ticket
buyer – our proxy for lottery stock investor. In particular, counties with more lottery stocks are
generally located in urban areas, have greater proportion of Catholics and minorities, and lower
levels of household income and education attainment. In addition, we observe that lottery stocks
tend to be located in areas with larger difference in mortality rate between the last three days of a
month and the first three days of the next month, consistent with the notion that changes in the
personal liquidity position of the average local investor are more likely to occur in counties
where lottery type stocks are headquartered.

4. Empirical Results
4.1 ToM Effect and Lottery-type Stocks’ Performance
We begin our empirical investigation by examining whether our sample displays the
general ToM effect and the under-performance of lottery-type stocks documented in previous
studies. Our aim is to first confirm the overall return premium on lottery stocks and the overall
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turn-of-the-month effect, and then to assess the magnitude of the differential turn-of-the-month
effect for lottery stocks versus non-lottery stocks. We estimate the following model:
Reti,t = β0 + β1 Lotteryi,t + β2 ToM,t + β3 Lotteryi,t * ToM,t + β4 Friday t + β5 Log(Size)i,t +
β6 Log(BM)i,t + β7 Turnover i,t +β8 Leveragei,t + β9 Past_Reti,t + β10 MKTi,t +
β11 SMB i,t + β12 HMLi,t + β13 UMDi,t + ∑time dummies + ∑Industries dummies
+ εi,t

(2)

where Reti,t is stock return measured at day t for stock i; Lotteryi,t is a dummy variable which
equals one if stock i is categorized as lottery-type stock at t and zero otherwise; ToMi,t is an
indicator variable that equals one if the trading day t falls in the ToM period and zero otherwise.
A host of control variables are firm size, book-to-market ratio, volume turnover, leverage, past
12-month returns, common risk factors, and an indicator variable that takes the value of one if
day t falls on a Friday. We also include time (year and month) as well as industry (defined at the
2-digit SIC-code level) indicator variables. εi,t is a zero mean, random disturbance term. Since
the sample is comprised of panel data from 1980 to 2010, we adjust standard errors for
correlation across firms using cluster robust standard errors at firm- and day level for all the
regressions in this paper.
The ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression results shown in Table 1.2. Columns 1 and 2
show the results of a model without controls and fixed effects. The Lottery coefficient is negative
and significant, and the ToM coefficient is positive and significant. Thus, these results, together
with the univariate evidence from Table 1.1, confirm that the ToM and lottery stocks effects in
our sample lottery are of roughly the same magnitude as in prior studies. Moreover, the
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coefficient estimate of the interaction term, Lottery * ToM is positive and significant at the 1%
level, suggesting that lottery-type stocks on average have higher ToM returns than those of nonlottery-type and other-type stocks. The magnitude of the interaction coefficient estimate is 0.033,
indicating that lottery-type stocks on average have 0.033% higher daily returns during the turn of
the month period. Columns 3 present results estimating the full model shown in Eq. (5). The
Lottery, ToM and Lottery * ToM coefficients retain their sign, magnitude and significance even
after controlling for firm characteristics, industry- and time-fixed effects.
In the last three columns of Table 1.2 we examine whether lottery stocks’ ToM effect is
driven by any of the three characteristics (low stock rice, high idiosyncratic skewness and high
idiosyncratic volatility) that together classify a stock as lottery-type. The results show that no
individual lottery-stock characteristic has, by itself, a significant impact on the ToM effect. Thus,
taken together, the findings in Table 1.2 support the notion that there is the lottery stocks’ ToM
effect, and it is not driven by a single lottery-stock characteristic. In the next section we will take
a closer look at the mechanism of this positive relationship between lottery stocks and ToM
effect.
4.2 Lottery-type Stocks’ ToM Effect and Local Investors Demographic Profile
Why do stocks with lottery features outperform the rest of the market during the turn of
month, while they tend to perform poorly in the long run? This section provides an investigation
of the hypothesis that local investors’ preference for lottery type stocks could be the driver of the
anomaly in lottery stock returns at the turn of month.
Given the fact that individuals’ equity investments are characterized by bias toward
stocks of firms located nearby (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999), lottery-type stocks’ strong
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performance at the turn of month could simply be driven by a sharp increase in demand from
local investors. According to Kumar (2009a), lottery-type stocks and state lottery players attract
quite similar groups of people. Specifically, individual investors who have low levels of income
and education, are less sophisticated, belong to ethnic minority groups, are Catholics, and live in
urban areas, fit the typical profile of investors who have strong preference for stocks with lottery
features. Thus, we expect that lottery-type stocks should experience even higher returns at the
turn of month when they are located in areas with many local investors that fit the profile of a
lottery ticket buyer.
To test this prediction of our second hypothesis, we estimate a model like the one found
in Column 3 of Table 1.2, with the addition of variables that are indicative of strong presence of
lottery-type local investors as well as their interactions with Lottery and ToM. These variables
are Catho/Prot, Urban, Income, Education, AfriWhi, and InstOwn. Each one of these variables
captures a different demographic characteristic of the county-level concentration of local lotterystock investors as reported in Kumar (2009a). The last variable, InstOwn, is added to account for
the likelihood that stock pricing is more likely to be affected by local individual investors in the
absence of sizeable institutional ownership. To assess the combined effect of these measures, we
also create an index (LSLI-Index) that comprises all six measures and is used as a proxy for the
concentration of local lottery-type stocks investors. As discussed in detail in Section 3.2, the
LSLI-Index is constructed in such a way that each of six indicator variables receives equal weight
in the index and that counties with high concentration of lottery-type stock local investors have
larger values of LSLI-Index. For brevity, we denote each of these variables as a DemoFactor in
the regression. Specifically, we estimate the following regression model:
Reti,t = β0 + β1 Lotteryi,t + β2 ToM,t + β3 Lotteryi,t * ToM,t + β4Friday t + β5 DemoFactori,t +
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β6 DemoFactor * Lottery i,t + β7 DemoFactor * ToM i,t +β8 DemoFactor * ToM * Lottery i,t
+ ∑Controls + εi,t

(3)

The main variable of interest in this regression model is thus DemoFactor * ToM *
Lottery, which gives us some idea about whether the more pronounced ToM effect for lotterytype stocks is driven by its lottery-like feature itself or the demographic characteristics associated
with their investors. Collectively, the regression results, reported in Table 1.3, provide support
for the second hypothesis and are in line with the notion that the superior performance of lottery
stocks around the turn-of-the-month occurs when there is a sizeable presence of local lotterytype investors. In Column 1, we test the effect of InstOwn on ToM stock returns. The coefficient
estimate of InstOwn is negative and significant, indicating that low institutional ownership is
associated with better stock performance at the turn of month. More importantly, we observe that
the interaction term DemoFactor * ToM * Lottery is negative and significant, suggesting that the
aforementioned negative association between institutional ownership and ToM return
performance is more pronounced among lottery stocks. This result provides support to our
argument that lottery-type stocks with lower institutional ownership attract more lottery-type
investors and consequently they experience a higher demand-driven price hike and
corresponding surge in return at the turn of the month. In the models shown in Column 2 through
Column 6, we examine the effect of other indicators of concentration of local investors with
strong propensity to gamble, on the ToM stock returns and find similar results: the ToM returns
of lottery-type stocks are significantly influenced by the concentration of lottery-type stock local
investors in a positive way: lottery-type stocks have higher ToM returns when the firm’s
headquarter is located in an urban county, or in a county with high proportion of Catholics, or
lower annual household income, or lower percentage of college education attainment, or larger
16

African American to White American ratio. In Column 7 we also use the LSLI-Index, an
aggregate measure of the lottery-type local investor concentration, and find our result still holds.
Moreover, as the results in Table 1.3 show, the inclusion of these lottery-type stock local investor
indicator variables in our regression causes the strong positive relation between Lottery and ToM
returns to disappear. In fact, the Lottery * ToM coefficient becomes insignificant in all but one
model, where it is marginally significant at the 10%-level. This evidence is consistent with the
view that lottery-type stocks by themselves are not the reason of their stronger ToM effect.2
4.3 Possible Explanations
In this subsection we provide tests that are free of identification issues and aimed at
providing evidence that alleviates concerns about alternative explanations based on the potential
for endogeneity.
4.3.1 Lottery-type Stocks’ ToM Effect after Stock Splits
In the first test, we consider an exogenous shock to stock price, i.e., stock split, and test
whether this decrease in stock price will increase the ToM effect of lottery-type stocks. The
reason that we focus on the event of stock split is that it constitutes an exogenous decrease in
stock price, which renders the stock more lottery-like since a low stock price is one of the criteria
for being a lottery type-stock. This test can indicate whether the ToM effect is driven by demand
for lottery-type stocks and not some unobservable characteristic correlated with being ‘lotterytype’.

2

Although the interactions effects shown in Table 1.3 could be emanating from variation in local investors’ lottery
preferences they could also be driven by variation in local investors’ personal liquidity constraints. We address this
issue in a later section. Also, based on the evidence of Kumar, Page and Spalt (2013) and Korniotis, Kumar and
Page (2013) we would expect that the ToM effects we reveal would be more pronounced when local bias is stronger.
In unreported tests, we confirm this hypothesis. Results of these additional tests are suppressed for the sake of
brevity but are available from the authors upon request.
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The stock splits’ data are from CRSP. We consider all stocks that have Factor to Adjust
Prices variable with values greater than or equal to 2-for-1, so that there is a substantial decrease
in stock price after the split. To be qualified as a stock split event, the stock needs to have return
data available over the 12-month period before the split and over the 12-month period after the
split. The final split sample contains 3,075 events.
To examine the effect of stock splits on ToM effect, we perform the test separately for
the following two cases: 1) firms that were lottery-type stocks in terms of idiosyncratic volatility
and

skewness

but

not

in

terms

of

price

prior

to

the

stock

split,

and

2) firms that were lottery-type prior to the stock split, and remained lottery type after the stock
split. If the ToM effect is truly driven by the demand of local “gamblers”, we would expect the
effect to be stronger after the stock split for both cases since lower stock prices should render
these stocks more attractive to lottery stock investors. The regression model follows the
specification of Eq.(2), except that we replace the main variable of interest with a Split dummy,
which equals one for all trading days after the stock split and zero for all days prior to the stock
split:
Reti,t = β0 + β1 Spliti,t + β2 ToMi,t + β3 Split * ToM i,t+ ∑Controls + εi,t

(4)

The first three columns of Table 1.4 report the regression results estimating Eq. (4), for
firms that were lottery-type stocks in terms of idiosyncratic volatility and skewness but not in
terms of price prior to the stock split. In the full sample test, the coefficient of Split * ToM is
positive and significant at the 5% level, suggesting that ToM effect actually goes up for those
stocks that experience a stock split on average. In the subsamples’ test the coefficient of Split *
ToM is positive and significant in the highest LSLI-Index tercile group (High-LISI area, hereafter)
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but it becomes insignificant in the lowest LSLI-Index tercile group (Low-LISI area, hereafter).
This result is in line with our prediction that the demand for stocks of firms located in areas with
high concentration of lottery-type stock local investors will increase when there is a decrease in
stock price while stocks of firms located in areas with low concentration of lottery-type stock
local investors are unlikely to be affected.
The next three columns of Table 1.4 report the regression results estimating Eq. (4), for
firms that were lottery-type prior to the stock split, and remained lottery type after the stock split.
Once, again, if a lower stock price is one of the features that attract local investors with high
propensity for gambling, a stock split should generate more demand for lottery-type stocks and
thus a higher ToM effect. The results support our prediction. The coefficients of Split * ToM are
positive and significant in all three samples, suggesting that ToM effect typically goes up for
lottery-type stocks after split. Using stock split as an exogenous shock to stock price, the test
presented in Table 1.4 provides evidence that it is the demand for lottery-type stocks and not
some unobservable characteristic that drives such stocks’ performance at the ToM.
Finally we address the possibility that stock splits may be associated with other
differences in the stock, or may simply be attention-grabbing events that attract retail investors
for reasons that may have little to do with lottery preferences. Thus, in the last three columns of
Table 1.4 we performed the stock split tests for the subsample of firms that are not lottery stocks
either before or after the split. The results in columns (7)-(9) show that the split dummy’s
coefficient is not significant in any regression. Thus, our main results are not driven by these
aforementioned possible effects.
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4.3.2 Other Identification Tests
We also investigate the impact of local trading on lottery stocks’ ToM effect by
accounting for exogenous shocks that can either directly constrain local trading or effectively
reduce the stocks’ recognition by local investors favoring stocks with lottery characteristics.
In the first test we follow Shive (2012) and examine whether the ToM effect of lotterytype stocks becomes weaker when local trading is constrained by a power outage. 3 If our
conjecture that the more pronounced ToM effect of lottery-type stocks is driven by higher
demand by local investors with propensity to gamble is correct, then we such observe a more
attenuated ToM effect in areas experiencing during power outages because local trading would
be constrained. In the second test, we consider headquarter relocations as exogenous shocks to
firm’s exposure to gambling-minded investors. We investigate whether the corresponding
change in concentration of local lottery stock investors can impact the ToM effect of lottery-type
stocks. If the previously documented ToM effect of lottery-type stocks is driven by local
gamblers’ demand, we expect lottery type firms would experience a stronger (weaker) ToM
effect when they move from a Low(High)-LISI area to a High(Low)-LISI area due to a
corresponding change in demand during ToM.4

3

The power outage data are from the Electric Power Monthly provided by the Energy Information Administration.
It reports detailed data on power outages in the U.S. since 2002 such as the beginning and end date of the
disturbance, and the area affected, etc. We follow Shive (2012) and define ‘‘outage period’’ as the first full business
day of the outage. To be included in the sample, a power outage needs to affect 100,000 customers or more with a
specified blackout area. Shive (2012) finds that local trading is adversely affected by large power outages in the U.S.,
with turnover of stocks in the affected areas dropping significantly. If our conjecture that the more pronounced ToM
effect of lottery-type stocks is driven by higher demand by local investors with propensity to gamble is correct, then
we such observe a more attenuated ToM effect in areas experiencing during power outages because local trading
would be constrained.
4
The address change data are from McDonald’s website (http://www3.nd.edu/ ~mcdonald/10-K_Headers/10K_Headers.html). It reports header information on the 10-K report from SEC’s EDGAR website, including the
occurrence of headquarter change of filing firms from 1996-2010.
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The results of these tests are shown in Appendix B and provide additional strong support
for the notion that the ToM effect of lottery-type stocks is at least partly driven by demand of
local investors who have a preference for such stocks.
4.4. Monthly Cycles in Personal liquidity and Lottery Stocks’ ToM Effect
Since the liquidity position of people with limited income and wealth deteriorates
towards the end of month and recovers at the beginning of the next month, we posit that lotterytype stocks’ superior performance could be driven by a surge in demand associated with changes
in personal liquidity of lottery stock investors. In particular, we argue that investors’ ability and
desire to gamble in the stock market change through the month and tend to reach a peak at the
turn of month when their personal liquidity position experiences a sharp change, going from
worst to best.
To properly test the aforementioned hypothesis, we need to cleanly identify that the price
effects we showed are indeed a result of monthly cycles in personal liquidity of investors. The
evidence so far can be interpreted as suggesting that the ToM effect of lottery-type stocks could
be linked with the (monthly) cyclicality of local investors’ liquidity positions. Indeed the
demographic characteristics that predict lottery participation are also characteristics that would
be associated with more binding monthly liquidity cycles. That is, households with lower income
and education are more likely participate in lotteries, but also are more likely to live paycheckto-paycheck. Thus, it is hard to identify whether the interaction effects we found in Table 1.3 are
coming from variation in lottery preferences versus variation in personal liquidity constraints. In
the next two sub-sections, we provide identification tests designed to establish a direct link
between the cyclicality of lottery stock investors’ personal liquidity positions and lottery-type
stocks’ performance at the ToM.
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4.4.1 Demand for Lottery-type Stocks at ToM
We start with a direct test of whether there is cyclicality in trading behavior of investors
who are liquidity constrained and prefer to hold lottery-type stocks. We use the trading data of
investors from a large discount brokerage firm on the investments of 77,995 households from
1991 through 1996 (see Barber and Odean (2000, 2001) for detailed description of retail investor
database). We follow Kumar (2009a) and test the null hypothesis that liquidity-constrained
investors buy more lottery-type stocks at the ToM, but not at other times, by estimating the
following regression model:
EBSIt = β0 + β1ToM + β2UNEMPm + β3 UEIm + β4 MPm + β5 RPm +β6 TSm+ εi,t

(5)

The dependent variable is the excess buy-sell imbalance (EBSI) on day t of a given month. It is
defined as EBSIt =LotBSIt −RemBSIt, where LotBSIt, is the day t buy–sell imbalance of a
portfolio of lottery stocks, and RemBSIt is the day t buy–sell imbalance of a portfolio that
contains the remaining stocks. We use the buy and sell volume of each investor and construct the
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buy–sell imbalance (BSI) of portfolio p on day t as BSIp,t = 𝑁𝑝𝑡 ∑𝑁𝑝𝑡
𝐵𝑆𝐼 . The BSI for stock i on
1
day t is defined as BSIi,t =

(𝑉𝐵𝑖,𝑡−𝑉𝑆𝑖,𝑡)
(𝑉𝐵𝑖,𝑡+𝑉𝑆𝑖,𝑡)

, where VBi,t is the buy volume for stock i on day t, VSi,t

is the sell volume for stock i on day t. The main independent variable is ToM, which is an
indicator variable that equals one if the trading day is at ToM and zero otherwise. Control
variables are monthly based and include: UNEMPm, the U.S. unemployment rate in month m;
UEIm, the unexpected inflation in month m; MPm, the monthly growth in industrial production;
RPm is the monthly risk premium; TSm, the term spread.
Table 1.5 presents the time series regression estimating Eq. (4). The results show that
although individual investors do not exhibit a significant cyclicality in demand for lottery-type
stocks at ToM in general, those who live in areas with high concentration of lottery-type local
investors do: the ToM dummy’s coefficient is not significant in the full sample test after
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controlling for macroeconomics variables, but it becomes positive and significant in model
estimated using the subsample of the highest LSLI-Index tercile group. This result confirms that
the demand for lottery-type stocks exhibits a certain monthly cyclicality and is higher at ToM for
liquidity-constrained investors.
To more directly address the concern that the lottery sock investor demographic profile
index (LSLI) can be proxying for both lottery preferences and personal liquidity constraints, we
re-estimate the model for subsamples formed based on state-level per capita lottery expenditures
as a proxy for investor preferences toward lottery-type stocks employed by Kumar (2009a).
Column 5 and 6 show the results of test performed using the subsamples of firms located in
states ranking in the top and bottom terciles after ranking on lottery stock preferences. The
coefficient of the ToM dummy is not significant in either column. The result is only significant
at 10% level for the high preference tercile, indicating that there might be a correlation between
the lottery preference and our liquidity constraint measure and that the impact of lottery
preference on demand of lottery stocks is somewhat weaker than that of liquidity constraint
measure. We can therefore conclude that the demand for lottery type stocks at the turn of the
month is not driven by lottery preferences per se, but rather by a change in the personal liquidity
position experienced by many local retail investors at the end of the month.
4.4.2 ToM stock Returns and Change in Local Investors’ Personal Liquidity Positions
Our last identification strategy involves devising a measure of personal liquidity changes
by taking some other phenomenon that has been tied to monthly household liquidity and use it to
identify cross-sectional variation in the degree to which the personal liquidity constraints’
monthly cycle is binding. As suggested by Evans and Moore (2012), a within-month cycle of a
range of economic activities generated by changes in personal liquidity is reflected in a similar
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pattern of changes in mortality rate, with the largest peak-to-trough fluctuations experienced
around the turn of a month. Thus, we use the county-level change in mortality at the turn of
month to identify change in personal liquidity of local investors, and argue that if the spike in
mortality around the turn of the month is bigger for a given county, we may infer that the
monthly pay cycles are more binding for households in that county, and in turn the lottery stock
ToM effect should be more pronounced in counties with large changes in mortality around the
ToM.
In Table 1.6 we regress ΔMortality and its interaction with Lottery and ToM, using the
model specification shown in Eq.(3) and ΔMortality in place of the demographic factor variable.
Recall that ΔMortality is accurately measured for the earlier part of our sample (1980-1988)
when complete death rate information is available on a daily basis, but only approximated for all
years thereafter (1989-2010). Accordingly, and to ensure that results are not driven by
measurement error associated with the approximate measure, the model is estimated separately
for the subsamples consisting of the 1980-1988 and the 1989-2004 periods. Indeed, we obtain
similar results across the two sub-period tests. The coefficient of the main variable of interest,
ΔMortality* Lottery*ToM, is positive and significant in the full sample regressions (see columns
1 and 5), indicating that lottery-type stocks’ performance at the ToM is stronger in counties
where there was a large change in mortality at the turn of month than in counties where there was
only a small change in mortality over the same period: an evidence that supports our argument
that the change of personal liquidity of local investors at the turn of month is at least partly
accountable for the significant surge in returns of lottery-type stocks. The results in the LSLIIndex terciles’ subsamples tests provide further insight and strengthen our argument that demand
by lottery type investors is responsible for the surge in lottery stocks’ performance at ToM. The
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coefficient of ΔMortality*Lottery*ToM is insignificant in the lowest LSLI-Index tercile group, i.e.
among firms located in areas with least likelihood of existence of lottery-type stock local
investors. However, it becomes more positive and significant as we move to the highest- LSLIIndex tercile regressions: the impact of change of personal liquidity on lottery-type stock ToM
returns increases with the concentration of lottery-type local investors. This is in line with our
expectations and indicates that the channel through which the change in personal liquidity affects
lottery stocks’ ToM returns cannot exist in the absence of a critical mass of local investors with
high propensity for gambling.
While this analysis produces intuitive results, we acknowledge that there are two
potential problems associated with it. One is the possibility that changes in mortality rates at the
turn of the month may be capturing something else other than the degree to which gamblinginclined investors’ monthly pay cycles become binding. The other concern is with respect to the
approximation measure for the mortality rate used in the post-1988 period due to the incomplete
information on daily death rates. This latter concern is less serious in light of the consistent
results obtained from the two subsamples.
4.5 Trading Strategies
In this subsection, we investigate whether a trading strategy designed around the patterns
found in our results can be potentially exploitable for practitioners. We have found that the
outperformance of lottery-type stocks at the turn of month seems to be more pronounced in areas
where there is high concentration of lottery stock local investors. In unreported tests we also
found that the underperformance of local lottery-type stocks during non-ToM periods is
exacerbated when there is high concentration of this type of investor in the area. Thus, in our
trading strategy, we consider an arbitrage portfolio formed by taking opposite (long/short)
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positions during the ToM and non-ToM days of each month in two extreme portfolios: the
portfolio of lottery-type stocks and the portfolio of non-lottery-type stocks. Specifically, the
aforementioned zero-net investment portfolio will consist of a long position in the lottery-type
stocks’ portfolio and a short position in the non-lottery-type stocks’ portfolio during the 4 days
of the ToM. The long and short positions will then be reversed during other periods, i.e. short the
lottery-type portfolio and long the non-lottery portfolio in the non-ToM period of each month.
We then estimate the risk-adjusted performance of this arbitrage portfolio using the four-factor
model (Fama and French, 1993; Carhart, 1997) and daily returns and present the results in Table
1.7. Columns 1-3 (4-6) show results using equally-weighted (value-weighted) returns.
Column 1 in Table 1.7 reports the coefficient estimates of the four-factor regression
model for the full sample portfolio. The alpha is positive and significant at the 5% level with the
magnitude of 0.053, indicating that our arbitrage portfolio’s risk-adjusted daily return is 5.3 basis
points, which corresponds to about 13.4% per year. Although we do not consider any direct
trading costs, the magnitude of the gross return indicates that this strategy’s yield is
economically significant as well. We also repeat the test by examining the performance of the
investment strategy when the stocks involved are only from the areas with high and low
concentration of lottery-stock local investors. Columns 2 and 3 report the coefficient estimates of
the four-factor regression model for the subsample portfolios in areas with many (high LSLIIndex) and few (low LSLI-Index) gamblers, respectively. The alpha estimate is positive and
significant at the 1%-level with a magnitude of 0.060 in Column 2, while it is not significant in
Column 3. The results indicate that while the trading strategy is even more profitable (annual
alpha of about 15.1%) when applied to the portfolios that only include firms located in the high
concentration of lottery-stock local investors, it fails to outperform the regression-based
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benchmark when applied using the portfolios that only include firms located in areas with few
investors that fit the profile of a lottery-type stock investor. To alleviate the concerns that
equally-weighted stock returns might be upward-biased (see Asparouhova et al., 2013) we also
report results based on this trading strategy using the value-weighted portfolio in Column 4-6 of
Table 1.7. The gross return of the value-weighted arbitrage portfolio is somewhat reduced
relative to that of the equally-weighted arbitrage portfolio.

5. Conclusion
In contrast to prior studies’ evidence suggesting that, on average, lottery-type stocks
exhibit poor performance, we find that they outperform all other stocks at the turn of month.
Specifically, controlling for the turn-of-week effect, common risk factors and time- and industryfixed effects, as well as for several firm characteristics, we find a significantly more pronounced
ToM effect for lottery-type stocks than all other stocks. We show that this effect is not likely to
be attributed to being a lottery-type stock per se. For example, ToM returns of lottery-type stocks
are significantly stronger after stock splits or after headquarters moves to areas with high
concentration of gambling-minded local investors. More importantly, we show that the ToM
effect for lottery-type stocks is at least partially driven by the within-month cycle of such
investors’ personal liquidity, which typically is at a low-point toward the end of each calendar
month and at a high-point at the beginning of each calendar month.
Our paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, we provide valuable insight
into the within-month cyclical behavior of lottery-type stocks and deliver a link to the wellknown ToM effect as well as to the within-month cyclicality of economic activity driven by
personal liquidity changes around the ToM.

Second, we contribute to the literature that
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addresses the importance of retail investors in the pricing of stocks and highlight the importance
of demographics in empirically gauging retail investor behavior. Third we add new evidence that
it is not the individual characteristics of lottery stocks (i.e. high skewness, high volatility, or low
price) but their combination that matters in producing the positive ToM return pattern. Finally,
our evidence provides the basis for the blueprint of investment strategies that can be used by
practitioners.
Most importantly, our findings have several implications for future research. For example,
the existence of a sizeable gambler-investor base that arguably is more prone to inattention may
be associated with greater under-reaction to relevant news. For example, if local retail investors
who like lottery-type stocks tend to pay less attention to news during periods they can gamble
more, then earnings announcements issued at the ToM should be associated with more postearnings announcement drift. Moreover, if the cyclical, within-month pattern of lottery stock
prices is persistent, managers may be tempted to manage the timing of news, with more bad
earnings news announced at ToM days and more good news at non-ToM days. In conjunction,
the above two scenarios could be contributing to the lottery stocks’ ToM effect, but also to the
overall monthly cyclicality of lottery stock prices our paper has documented.
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Table 1.1 Stock characteristics and summary statistics
Table 1.1 Panel A reports the mean monthly stock characteristics of lottery-type stocks and the rest of stocks over the sample period 1980-2010. We define types of stocks at the end of each month using
all stocks in the CRSP universe. Stocks that are in the lowest 50th stock price percentile, the highest 50th idiosyncratic volatility percentile, and the highest 50th idiosyncratic skewness percentile at the
end of each month are defined as lottery-type stocks. Those stocks belong to none of those three categories are defined as non-lottery type stocks. Those stocks that are neither lottery-type nor
nonlottery-type are defined as other-type. Panel B reports the summary statistics of variables used in regressions. Definitions of all variables are listed in Appendix A.
Panel A: Basic characteristics of lottery stocks
Variable

Lottery-Type

Nonlottery-Type and Other-Type

Number of Stocks

5059

17062

Price

5.02

20.78

Idiosyncratic Volatility

30.45

8.48

Idiosyncratic Skewness

1.94

0.21

Past Return (%)

8.77

15.21

Size (in millions)

119.22

1854.79

BM

0.88

0.24

Age (in years)

6.17

15.64

Analyst

2.55

7.46

Panel B: Summary statistics of variables used in regressions
Lottery-type
Variable

Nonlottery- and other-type

N

Mean

Std

P25

Median

P75

N

Mean

Std

P25

Median

P75

Diff

T-Stat

Ret (%)

3,852,649

0.053

9.105

-3.859

0

4.656

13,485,176

0.071

6.352

-2.539

0

3.896

-0.018

-25.26***

ToM_Ret (%)

1,069,876

0.302

7.689

-2.564

0

2.465

3,810,595

0.21

3.631

-1.075

0

1.339

0.092

18.86***

Size (mils)

3,852,649

99.8

340.3

17.1

43.8

114.2

13,485,176

1570

5982.4

110.8

385.2

1409

-1470.2

-20.66***

BM

3,852,649

0.689

0.675

0.218

0.482

0.888

13,485,176

0.401

0.472

0.213

0.423

0.687

0.288

29.35***

Turnover (%)

3,852,649

0.651

3.585

0.053

0.198

0.567

13,485,176

0.923

23.534

0.093

0.277

0.736

-0.272

-13.43***

Leverage

3,852,649

0.469

0.658

0.241

0.419

0.626

13,485,176

0.542

0.208

0.368

0.519

0.638

-0.073

-10.53***
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Table 1 Panel B (Continued)
Past returns (%)

3,852,649

10.58

67.58

2.68

8.95

13.65

13,485,176

19.67

48.36

6.58

13.36

23.69

-9.09

InstOwn

3,852,649

0.213

0.203

0.056

0.15

0.314

13,485,176

0.516

0.217

0.452

0.630

0.762

-0.303

-19.62***

Urban

3,852,649

0.476

0.5

0

0

1

13,485,176

0.433

0.495

0

0

1

0.043

12.06***

CathoDum

3,852,649

0.475

0.485

0

0

1

13,485,176

0.382

0.485

0

0

1

0.093

18.22***

Catho/Prot

3,852,649

2.524

2.039

0.776

2.012

3.854

13,485,176

2.402

1.917

0.635

1.7

3.736

0.122

15.06***

Income (000s)

3,852,649

40.15

11.66

42.36

45.33

55.86

13,485,176

50.16

11.51

42.67

49.932

63.32

-10.01

-9.88***

AfriWhi

3,852,649

0.252

0.281

0.057

0.14

0.294

13,485,176

0.197

0.222

0.045

0.113

0.254

0.055

26.55***

Education

3,852,649

34.43

9.448

24.876

28.545

39.12

13,485,176

36.287

9.153

26.98

31.232

40.05

-1.861

-23.84***

ΔMortality %

3,852,649

0.005

0.024

0.0142

0.004

0.006

13,485,176

0.0033

0.0171

0.0029

0.0029

0.003

0.0017

19.43***
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Table 1.2 Lottery-type stocks, ToM effect and stock returns
Table 1.2 examines the differential ToM effect for lottery-type stocks versus other stocks. The dependent variable is the daily stock returns. The
independent variables are lottery-type stock dummy, ToM dummy, and other control variables, such as firm size, book-to-market ratio, turnover
volume, Friday indicator variable, past 12-months returns, and four risk factors in the four-factor model. Definitions of all variables are listed in
Appendix A. In column 2-6, both industry - (i.e., the first two-digit SIC code) and time - (year and month) dummies are included, but coefficient
estimates are omitted for brevity. In Column 4-6, the main independent variables are low price dummy (Low_Prc), high skewness dummy
(High_Skew), high idiosyncratic volatility dummy (High_IdioVol), respectively. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics calculated using robust
standard errors adjusted by heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm and the day level. ***, **, * indicate a two-tailed test significance level at
the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.

Dependent Variable

Daily stock returns (%)
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

ToM

0.019**

0.018**

0.014*

0.020**

0.019**

0.020***

(2.13)

(2.20)

(1.89)

(2.22)

(2.13)

(2.73)

Lottery

-0.021**

-0.012**

-0.010**

(-2.38)
Lottery*ToM

(-2.08)

(-2.15)

0.035***

0.025**

(3.16)

(2.43)

Low_prc

0.009
(0.88)

Low_prc*ToM

0.013
(1.22)

High_skew

0.013

High_skew*ToM

-0.006

(1.27)
(-0.57)
High_idio

0.004
(0.52)

High_idio*ToM

0.004
(0.76)

Log(Size)

-0.042***
(-4.47)

(-3.23)

(-3.46)

(-2.41)

Log(BM)

-0.054**

-0.012*

-0.043**

-0.055***

(-2.23)

(-1.69)

(-2.33)

(-2.68)

0.285**

0.115

0.198*

0.225*

(2.40)

(1.13)

(1.76)

(1.70)

Turnover
Leverage
Friday
Past returns

-0.026***

-0.029***

-0.028**

0.087**

0.043

0.038

0.062*

(1.99)

(1.30)

(0.76)

(1.79)

0.223***

0.203***

0.253***

0.237***

(7.10)

(7.00)

(8.76)

(7.56)

0.020**

0.015*

0.018**

0.019*

(2.15)

(1.78)

(1.85)

(1.69)
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Table 1.2 (Continued)

MKT

0.464***
(5.70)

(5.45)

(6.02)

(5.81)

SMB

-0.222**

-0.237*

-0.258**

-0.245*

(-2.18)

(-1.90)

(-2.06)

(-1.92)

HML

-0.078*

-0.063

0.048

-0.055

(1.87)

(1.23)

(1.08)

(1.37)

0.018

0.025*

0.007

0.013

UMD
Constant

Observations

0.473***

0.408***

0.363***

(1.45)

(1.70)

(1.23)

(0.69)

0.053***

0.042***

0.168***

0.135***

0.127***

0.013**

(13.33)

(5.65)

(6.45)

(5.22)

(5.01)

(2.00)

17,337,825

17,337,825

17,337,825

17,337,825

17,337,825

17,337,825

Adj. R-squared

0.0099

0.0105

0.0325

0.0328

0.0327

0.0330

Time Dummies

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Industry Dummies

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes
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Table 1.3 ToM stock returns and local lottery-type investors
Table 1.3 examines the relation between types of stocks and daily stock returns during ToM and non-ToM period, introducing interaction terms with seven variables, that characterize local lottery-type
investors, i.e., urban dummy, Catholics and Protestant ratio, institutional ownership, income, African Americans to White American ratio, percentage of population who have bachelor's or higher degree,
and Lottery Stock Local Investor Index. In each column, one of the seven demographic variables is used in the regression under the name, DemoFactor. Definitions of all variables are listed in Appendix
A. The base specification replicates Column 3 in Table 1.2, with the addition of each DemoFactor as well as its interactions with Lottery and ToM. In all specifications, the set of control variables
include firm size, book-to-market ratio, turnover volume, Friday indicator variable, past 12-months returns, and four risk factors in the four-factor model, but coefficient estimates are omitted for brevity.
Both industry and time dummies are included, but coefficient estimates are suppressed for brevity as well. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics calculated using robust standard errors adjusted by
heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm and the day level. ***, **, * indicate a two-tailed test significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.

Dependent Variable

Daily stock returns (%)
InstOwn

Urban

Catho/Prot

AfriWhi

Log(Income)

Education

LSLI

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

0.011**
(2.32)
-0.014
(-1.52)
0.010
(1.32)
0.083**
(2.33)
0.011
(1.00)
-0.003
(-0.30)
-0.117***
(-3.18)

0.012*
(1.72)
-0.022*
(-1.69)
-0.002
(-0.49)
0.006
(1.25)
-0.023**
(-2.08)
0.002
(0.22)
0.017*
(1.70)

0.008*
(1.90)
-0.005
(-0.65)
0.011
(0.49)
0.008
(0.61)
-0.005
(-0.53)
0.009
(0.86)
0.015**
(2.08)

0.012**
(1.99)
-0.016**
(-2.00)
0.013*
(1.78)
0.015
(1.12)
-0.163
(-1.38)
0.038
(1.20)
0.034**
(1.98)

0.010**
(2.06)
-0.012*
(-1.77)
0.016
(0.85)
-0.007
(-0.52)
0.001
(1.10)
-0.014
(-0.53)
-0.055**
(-2.27)

0.010**
(2.14)
-0.015*
(-1.89)
0.015
(1.13)
-0.012
(-1.13)
-0.015
(-0.92)
-0.002
(-0.75)
-0.036***
(-2.90)

0.009*
(1.69)
-0.010
(-1.65)
0.003
(0.45)
0.012
(0.71)
-0.006
(-0.70)
0.010
(1.23)
0.213***
(3.82)

17,337,825

17,337,825

17,337,825

17,337,825

17,337,825

17,337,825

17,337,825

0.0212

0.0205

0.0208

0.0220

0.0023

0.0221

0.0203

Controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Time Dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Industry Dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

ToM
Lottery
Lottery*ToM
DemoFactor
Lottery*DemoFactor
ToM*DemoFactor
Lottery*DemoFactor *ToM

Observations
Adj. R-squared
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Table 1.4 Stock splits and lottery type stocks’ ToM effect
This table examines the effect of stock splits on stock returns. In Group 1, we perform the test for firms that were lottery-type stocks in terms of idiosyncratic volatility and skewness but not in terms of
price prior to the stock split. In Group 2, we perform the test for firms that were lottery-type prior to the stock split, and remained lottery type after the stock split. In Group 3, we perform the test for
firms that are nonlottery-type either before or after splits. The sample only includes 12 months prior to and after the stock split event. The regression model follows the specification of Eq.(5), except that
we replace the main variable of interest with a Split dummy, which equals one for all trading days after the stock split and zero for all days prior to the stock split. Definitions of all variables are listed in
Appendix A. In all specifications, the set of control variables include firm size, book-to-market ratio, turnover volume, Friday indicator variable, past 12-months returns, and four risk factors in the fourfactor model, but coefficient estimates are omitted for brevity. Industry, stock and time dummies are included, but coefficient estimates are suppressed for brevity. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics
calculated using robust standard errors adjusted by heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm and the day level. ***, **, * indicate a two-tailed test significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10%,
respectively.

Dependent Variable

Daily stock returns (%)
Group 2 (Lottery stocks before
and after splits)

Group 1 (IV, skewness)

ToM
Split

Group 3 (Nonlottery stocks either
before or after splits)

Full Sample

T3 (Highest)

T1 ( Lowest)

Full Sample

T3 (Highest)

T1 ( Lowest)

Full Sample

T3 (Highest)

T1 ( Lowest)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

0.005

0.012**

0.014**

0.014**

0.011**

0.011**

0.009*

0.012*

0.004

(0.87)

(2.05)

(2.13)

(2.27)

(2.07)

(2.18)

(1.90)

(1.80)

(1.20)

0.003

-0.010

-0.002

-0.003

0.001

0.004

0.002

0.001

0.005

(1.09)

(-1.17)

(-0.37)

(-0.79)

(0.48)

(1.28)

(0.37)

(0.46)

(0.88)

0.009*

0.011**

0.004

0.007**

0.0008**

0.006**

0.003

0.000

0.006

(2.03)

(2.22)

(1.13)

(2.36)

(2.28)

(1.99)

(0.87)

(0.25)

(1.35)

3,612,107

1,230,365

1,240,252

2,144,067

698,068

702,246

5,326,879

1,425,983

1,436,250

0.0184

0.0176

0.0185

0.0167

0.0153

0.0165

0.0112

0.0103

0.0164

Controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Time Dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Industry Dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Stock Dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Split*ToM

Observations
Adj. R-squared
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Table 1.5 ToM stock returns and local investors’ demand for lottery-type stocks
Table 1.5 examines the demand of lottery stocks at the ToM using trading data from a large discount brokerage house. The dependent variable is
the excess buy-sell imbalance (EBSI) on day t of a given month. It is defined as EBSIt,m =LotBSIt,m −OthBSIt,m, where LotBSIt,m is the day t buy–
sell imbalance of a portfolio of lottery stocks in month m, and OthBSIt,m is the day t buy–sell imbalance of a portfolio that contains the other
remaining stocks in month m. Control variables include: UNEMPm, the U.S. unemployment rate in month m; UEIm, the unexpected inflation in
month m; MPm, the monthly growth in industrial production; RPm is the monthly risk premium; TSm, the term spread. Column 1 and 2 show the
results of the full sample tests. Column 3 and 4 show the results of subsample tests based on LISI-Index terciles. Column 5 and 6 show the results
of subsample tests based on terciles of lottery-type stocks preference. We use the state-level per capita lottery expenditures as a proxy for each
stock. Definitions of all variables are listed in Appendix A. ***, **, * indicate a two-tailed test significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10%,
respectively.
The buy–sell imbalance (BSI) of portfolio p on day t is defined as BSIp,t =

BSIi,t

=

100
𝑁𝑝𝑡

∑𝑁𝑝𝑡
𝐵𝑆𝐼, where the BSI for stock i on day t is defined as
1

(𝑉𝐵𝑖,𝑡−𝑉𝑆𝑖,𝑡)
(𝑉𝐵𝑖,𝑡+𝑉𝑆𝑖,𝑡)

VBi,t is the buy volume for stock i on day t, VSi,t is the sell volume for stock i on day t
Dependent Variable

Excess buy-sell imbalance of lottery-type stocks
Full Sample

Full Sample

T3 (Highest)

T1 (Lowest)

Highest Pref.
Tercile

Lowest Pref.
Tercile

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.154*

0.102

0.089**

0.075

(1.74)

(1.28)

(2.10)

(0.95)

0.199**

0.217***

0.194**

(2.33)

(2.85)

(2.11)

-0.056

0.543*

0.182

0.053
(1.04)
0.145*
(1.78)
0.211*
(1.69)
-0.043
(-1.33)
0.363**
(2.18)
-0.147
(-1.05)

(-1.23)

(1.74)

(0.56)

Lagged MP

-0.020

-0.043

-0.182*

(-0.77)

(-1.21)

(-1.73)

Lagger RP

0.488***

0.272**

0.133*

(5.62)

(1.98)

(1.90)

-0.256

-0.278*

-0.047

(-1.44)

(-1.87)

(-0.82)

0.167*
(1.86)
0.233**
(2.31)
0.152
(0.98)
-0.078
(-0.85)
0.528**
(2.30)
-0.127
(-1.33)

TOM dummy
Lagged UNEMP
Lagged UEI

Lagged TS
Constant

0.138

0.085

-0.043

0.532

0.166**

0.098

(0.87)

(1.52)

(-0.32)

(1.03)

(2.31)

(1.28)

Number of Days

1,499

1,499

1,499

1,499

Adj. R-squared

0.014

0.070

0.095

0.085

1,499
0.030

1,499
0.031

40

Table 1.6 ToM stock returns and personal liquidity positions
This table examines the effect of change of local lottery-type investors’ personal liquidity positions on ToM stock returns. We use county-level change in mortality at the turn of month (ΔMortality) as a
proxy for the change in personal liquidity of local investors. ΔMortality is the mean difference in mortality between the first three days of a month and last three days of the last month. The CDC dataset
includes complete daily death counts information for the early part of our sample, i.e. from 1980 till 1988, which allows us to directly measure ΔMortality. However, starting with 1989 it does not report
daily counts of deaths by date, but instead provides total counts for each month and average count for each day of the week within a month across all counties in the United States. Thus, for the period
1990-2010 ΔMortality is approximated following the procedure detailed in Section 3.2. Column 1 reports the full sample test using data from the period when ΔMortality needs to be approximated (i.e.
from 1989 to 2010). Subsample tests using 1989-2010 observations sorted by different terciles of lottery stock local investor index-"LSLI-Index" are performed in Columns 2 to 3. Correspondingly, tests
using the 1980-1988 sample for which ΔMortality can be measured accurately are performed in Columns 4 to 6. The LSLI-Index is defined as:

1
6𝑁

[Rank(Catho/Prot)+Rank(AfriWhi)+Rank(-

1

InstOwn)+Rank(-Income)+Rank(-Education)]+ Urban, where N is the total number of observations and Rank( ) is a function that returns the rank of the variable. The regression model follows the
6

specification of Column 3 in Table 1.2, with the addition of ΔMortality indicator as well as its interactions with Lottery and ToM. Definitions of all variables are listed in Appendix A. In all
specifications, coefficient estimates of control variables are omitted for brevity. Both industry and time dummies are included, but coefficient estimates are suppressed for brevity as well. Numbers in
parentheses are t-statistics calculated using robust standard errors adjusted by heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm and the day level. ***, **, * indicate a two-tailed test significance level at the
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.

Dependent Variable

Daily stock returns %
1989-2010
Full Sample

1980-1988

T3 (Highest)

T1 (Lowest)

Full Sample

T3 (Highest)

T1 (Lowest)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

ToM

0.016***

0.014**

0.020***

0.026***

0.020**

0.028***

(3.32)

(2.17)

(2.85)

(3.78)

(2.25)

(4.85)

Lottery

-0.018**

-0.024***

-0.012*

-0.014**

-0.016*

-0.016*

(-2.08)

(-2.90)

(-1.89)

(-1.98)

(-1.70)

(-1.77)

0.005

0.003

0.007

-0.029

0.010*

0.004

(1.28)

(1.02)

(0.80)

(-0.37)

(1.82)

(0.42)

ΔMortality

0.057

-0.006

0.187

0.086

0.062

0.096

(0.28)

(-0.04)

(1.00)

(0.37)

(0.40)

(0.48)

ToM*ΔMortality

-0.059

0.198

0.051

-0.714

0.149

0.411*

Lottery*ToM

Lottery*ToM*ΔMortality

(-0.32)

(1.00)

(1.02)

(-0.99)

(1.33)

(1.87)

3.285**

3.354**

-0.545

3.801**

4.636***

0.879

(2.03)

(2.38)

(-0.86)

(2.33)

(4.55)

(1.13)
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Table 1.6 (Continued)
Observations

12,307,173

4,102,322

4,102,368

5,030,652

1,676,795

1,676,758

0.015

0.013

0.007

0.018

0.019

0.011

Controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Time Dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Industry Dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Adj. R-squared
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Table 1.7 Trading strategies
This table presents the regression results of daily returns of our arbitrage portfolio on several risk factors. The first arbitrage portfolio is equallyweighted and consists of two parts: the portfolio of lottery-type stocks and the portfolio of nonlottery-type stocks. We then assess the
performance of the following trading strategy: long the lottery-type stocks portfolio and short the nonlottery-type portfolio during ToM days, then
reverse the position and go short the lottery stocks portfolio and long the non-lottery stocks portfolio during the non-ToM days of each month.
The full sample result and the subsample results for firms located in the high-LSLI area and in the low-LSLI area are shown in Column 1-3,
respectively. The second arbitrage portfolio is same as the first, except that all stocks in the portfolio are value-weighted. Corresponding
regression coefficients are reported in Column 4-6. MKT (Market Risk), SMB (Small Minus Big) , HML (High Minus Low), UMD (Up Minus
Down) are risk factors in the four-factor model.***, **, * indicate a two-tailed test significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Dependent
variable

Portfolio Returns (%)
EW

MKT

SMB

HML

UMD

VW

Full Sample

T3(Highest)

T1(Lowest)

Full Sample

T3(Highest)

T1(Lowest)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.038***

0.030**

0.029**

0.026*

0.023**

0.036**

(2.69)

(2.23)

(2.50)

(1.87)

(2.02)

(2.27)

0.023***

0.019***

0.012*

0.014**

0.034*

0.032

(3.36)

(3.10)

(1.75)

(2.14)

(1.85)

(1.23)

-0.118**

-0.106*

-0.063

-0.088

-0.072

-0.142**

(-2.23)

(-1.82)

(-1.07)

(-0.68)

(-0.85)

(-2.15)

0.022*

0.018

0.016

0.041**

0.052*

-0.051

(1.90)

(0.68)

(1.05)

(2.49)

(1.82)

(-1.32)

0.053**

0.060***

0.013

0.050*

0.057**

0.021

(1.99)

(2.84)

(0.45)

(1.68)

(2.00)

(0.82)

Observations

7905

7905

7905

7905

7905

7905

Adj. R-squared

0.157

0.162

0.133

0.155

0.177

0.152

Constant (α)
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Lottery-type Stocks and Corporate Strategies at the Turn of the Month
1. Introduction
A widely held belief in the investment community supported by academic
evidence is that managers often attempt to time their firms’ financing activities (e.g.,
Bayless and Chaplinsky, 1996) to take advantage of windows of opportunity offered by
“hot” periods of high aggregate demand in the market. In addition, it is well established
that firms time issuance of corporate earnings news so as or to influence the perceptions
of relatively unsophisticated investors (e.g. Givoly and Palmon, 1982; Kross and
Schroeder, 1984; Chambers and Penman, 1984). However, little is known about whether
firms plan financial activities by taking into consideration predictable patterns of demand
for their firms’ stock by retail investors. We address this question by investigating the
timing and structure of earnings announcements and seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) by
firms whose stocks exhibit lottery-like features (i.e., low price and high idiosyncratic
volatility and skewness). Such lottery-type firms’ stocks have been shown to attract
speculative retail investors (e.g. see Kumar, 2009a; Han and Kumar, 2013) and to
experience a predictable pattern of demand driven by within-month cyclicality of local
investors’ personal liquidity positions (see Meng and Pantzalis, 2016). Demand by
liquidity constrained investors with a propensity to gamble peaks at the ToM and
weakens thereafter causing stronger than usual stock price performance at the ToM
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followed by the underperformance during the non-ToM part of a monthly cycle.5 Meng
and Pantzalis (2016) find that lottery-type stocks’ ToM effect is particularly pronounced
among firms located in areas whose demographic profile resembles that of the typical
lottery-ticket buyers (i.e. gamblers).
We posit that the more pronounced ToM effect of lottery-type stocks reflects a
type of retail investor behavior that can provide a window of opportunity for the
managers of lottery-type firms. Our investigation in this study is focused on how
investors evaluate firm-specific information (e.g., corporate earnings announcements) of
lottery-type stocks released at the ToM, as well as how the management incorporates the
within-month cyclical pattern of lottery-type stocks performance when they engage in
major corporate activities, such as quarterly earnings announcements and seasoned equity
offerings (SEOs).
Relying on prior evidence that there is a strong association among pathological
gambling, attention deficit, and other impulse control disorders such as ADHD (e.g., see
Specker et. al, 1995; Faregh and Derevensky, 2011), we conjecture that when individuals
make decisions about high-stakes investments (such as those involving lottery stocks),
they tend to use information-processing heuristics that essentially limit the extent to
which they incorporate even the information they are actively observing (see, for
example, Lacetera, Pope, and Sydnor, 2011). Thus, we hypothesize that when lottery
investors’ are most active (i.e. around the ToM), they underreact to fundamentals-related

5

The ToM effect is a well-documented anomaly in the finance literature, where aggregate stock market
tends to perform significantly better during the initial few days of a trading month than during the rest of
the month, both in the U.S. market and other markets around the world (see Ariel, 1987; Lakonishok and
Smidt, 1988; and Cadsby and Ratner, 1992). Some studies show that the ToM effect could be related to
liquid profit position of investors (Odgen, 1990), and institutional practices (Cadsby and Ratner, 1992).
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news (i.e. earnings announcements), giving rise to more pronounced delayed response
(post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD)). We also investigate whether lottery-type
firms’ managers act opportunistically when they choose the time to issue fundamentalsrelated news, knowing that the typical investors attracted to lottery stocks tend to be less
responsive to such news when their propensity to gamble in at the high level. it is
possible that management of “lottery-type” firms might be timing the date of bad news
announcements to lessen its negative impact on stock price, i.e., they are more likely to
issue bad earnings news at the turn of month than those of the rest of firms.
In our second group of tests, we use the paradigm of lottery-type firms issuing
SEOs at the ToM as a natural experiment that allows us not only to examine whether
lottery investors’ underreaction to value-relevant information at ToM applies to other
corporate events, but also to take a closer look at the way the way managers behave,
knowing that the trading behavior of local investors who have propensity to gamble
follows a within-month cyclical pattern. The negative announcement period returns
around SEO announcements are well-documented by prior studies (see Masulis and
Korwar, 1986; Asquith and Mullins, 1986; Barclay and Litzenberger, 1988). If lotterytype stocks investors are less sensitive to the value-relevant news when they are most
active, they might respond less negatively to SEO announcements at ToM, possibly
followed by a more pronounced delayed reaction. We also hypothesize that management
of the lottery-type firms might strategically time the date of SEO announcement, taking
advantage of investors’ underreaction at the ToM. Lastly, we switch our attention to the
offering method that firms use when they issue seasoned offerings. Gao and Ritter (2010)
show that marketing effort can flatten the issuer’s short term demand curve and increase
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demand for the firm’s new issue. By issuing at the ToM, lottery-type firms can exploit
the temporary boost in demand from gambling-minded investors by employing an
accelerated offer method that would avoid the costly marketing fees charged by
investment bankers. We investigate the firm’s tendency to use accelerated offer method
in the SEOs issuance and see if the management is taking advantage of the short-term
demand spike in the lottery-type stocks.
Our findings can be summarized as follows. We first uncover a weaker immediate
reaction to lottery stocks’ earnings news issued at the turn of the month than the
corresponding reactions to other firms’ earnings news issued at the ToM. This
underreaction is found to be particularly pronounced among firms located in areas where
there is an abundance of local investors that fit the profile of lottery ticket buyers.
Furthermore we report that the immediate underreaction to earnings news by lottery
stocks at the ToM is followed by a stronger post-earnings announcement drift. The results
are consistent with the notion that lottery stock investors tend to be distracted at the ToM
when they make investments driven by impulse rather than paying attention to
fundamentals. These results are also consistent with the prior evidence that people suffer
attention deficit and are slow in information processing when they make decisions about
high-stakes investments (such as lottery stocks). In addition, “lottery-type” firms are
more likely to issue bad earnings news at the turn of month than those of the rest of firms.
This result provides evidence in support of our prediction that management of “lotterytype” firms opportunistically choose to issue bad earnings announcements at ToM to
attenuate its adverse impact on stock price.
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We then show that the weaker immediate reaction to lottery stocks’ corporate
events occurred at the turn of the month also apply to seasoned offering announcements,
i.e., the immediate reaction to SEO announcements at the ToM is less negative for lottery
stocks followed by a stronger post-announcement drift. In addition, we find that lotterytype firms have stronger propensity to issue SEO announcements at the turn of month
than the rest of firms, consistent with the view that management of “lottery-type” firms
might take advantage of lottery-type stock investors’ underreaction to

news about

fundamentals around the ToM, so as to reduce the negative price reaction to SEO
announcements.
In the SEO offer method framework, our investigation on the reaction of
managers to lottery-type stocks’ outperformance at the ToM yields additional interesting
results. . We show that lottery-type issuing firms are more likely to issue accelerated
offers at the ToM, which provides evidence in line with our prediction that corporate
managers may be more likely to act strategically by incorporating the lottery ToM effect
into their decisions on the timing and type of SEO.
In the last part of our analysis, we address the issue of whether our results can be
used by practitioners as the basis for investment strategies. We demonstrate that the postearnings announcement drift following earnings announcements issued by lottery stocks
at the ToM can be used to devise a simple trading strategy that yields an abnormal return
of about 14.7% per year. We also show that a similar trading strategy that is based on
underreaction of SEO announcements issued by lottery stocks at the ToM generates an
abnormal return about 8.5% per year, Although the returns of the aforementioned
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investment strategies are not adjusted for transactions costs, their sheer magnitude
implies that they are meaningful in economic terms.

2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
Stocks with lottery-like features have been studied by several past studies in
finance. Conjecturing that people’s propensity to gamble might relate to stock market
trading, Kumar (2009a) investigates possible links between investors’ propensity to
gamble and their stock investment decisions. His findings suggest that investors’
investment decisions are affected by their socioeconomic characteristics. For example,
investors who are poor, young, relatively less educated, single men, who live in urban
areas and belong to specific minority (African-American and Hispanic) and religious
(Catholic) groups are more likely to invest in lottery-type stocks, i.e. stocks that are
perceived as gambling devices. In Doran et al. (2012), the more pronounced gambling
mentality and higher level of trading activities around the New Year holiday are
associated with the outperformance of the lottery-like options and stocks in the U.S.,
which typically underperform during other periods of the year. A more recent and related
study by Meng and Pantzalis (2016) documents that lottery-type stocks outperform
during the ToM and that this outperformance is particularly pronounced among firms
located in areas with a high concentration of local investors that closely fit the
demographic characteristics of the typical lottery-ticket purchasers, who are less
sophisticated in nature. They attribute this outperformance to the within-month
cyclicality of local investors’ personal liquidity positions, which typically is at a trough
toward the end of each calendar month and at a peak at the beginning of each calendar
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month. A surge of lottery-type stock prices is at least partially driven by gamblinginclined investors’ demand during the ToM.
There is also a fairly large literature that argues that gambling is associated with
attention deficit and other similar impulse control disorders such as ADHD (Specker et al,
1995) and Faregh and Derevensky, 2011). In addition, it is quite possible that lotterytype stock investors during the turn of the month will tend to use heuristics that limit the
use of important information, as has been observed in the case of people making
decisions that involve high stakes (Lacetera, Pope, and Sydnor, 2011).Limited attention
of investors can lead to PEAD (see Hirshleifer et al. 2009; DellaVigna and Pollet, 2009)
described as “the tendency for a stock’s cumulative abnormal returns to drift in the
direction of an earnings surprise for several weeks following an earnings announcement”
by Livnat and Mendenhall (2006). We therefore argue that it is conceivable that lottery
investors may underreact to value-relevant information during the turn of the month,
when their gambling-motivated demand for lottery stocks peaks. If this conjecture is
correct we should observe a subdued immediate reaction to lottery stocks’ earnings news
issued at the ToM, followed by a more pronounced delayed reaction (i.e. more drift).
Thus, our first hypothesis deals with the way lottery type stocks’ investors
respond to relevant information during times when they are more likely to exhibit the
strongest level of demand for such stocks. Given that those gambling-motivated investors
are less sophisticated in nature, and are more prone to attention deficit, typically found in
gamblers with impulse control disorders, we hypothesize that these investors may be
paying less attention to fundamentals and value-relevant news when their demand for
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lottery stocks is at its peak, i.e. at the ToM. Thus, we expect that in that case they will
underreact to earnings announcements by lottery-type firms issued at the ToM.
Hypothesis 1: Lottery stocks earnings announcements issued at the turn of the
month will be met with a weaker (stronger) immediate (delayed) reaction, especially in
areas where local investors’ demographic profiles resemble those of individuals who are
typically attracted to lottery-type investments.
It is possible that management of “lottery-type” firms might be timing the date of
bad news announcements to lessen its negative impact on stock price, i.e., they are more
likely to issue bad earnings news at the turn of month than those of the rest of firms. The
second hypothesis is based on our conjecture that lottery firms’ management may be
strategically choosing to time the issuance of bad news at the ToM when local investors
are least attentive of fundamentals-related news.
Hypothesis 2: Lottery-type firms’ managers are more likely to tim the
announcement of bad news during a period when the local speculative retail investors’
demand for the stock is peaking, i.e., at ToM
Prior literature suggests that firms that issue SEO announcement are, on average,
associated with negative announcement period returns (see Masulis and Korwar, 1986;
Asquith and Mullins, 1986; Barclay and Litzenberger, 1988). This phenomenon can be
explained by the information asymmetry between issuers and investors, according to
Myers and Majluf (1984) because issuers are only willing to issue when the equity is
overvalued. Issuing new equity is thus being interpreted as a negative signal to firm’s
value. Lucas and McDonald (1990) show that as part of the consequence of the adverse
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selection problem managers’ market timing contributes to the decrease in equity prices
after SEO announcements and they predict a larger number of issues after a general
market rise. Another factor that may contribute to the negative announcement period
returns of SEOs is the price pressure of the negatively sloped demand curve (see Wurgler
and Zhuravskaya, 2002; Greenwood, 2005). Because the supply of shares typically
increases after the SEOs, the temporary price pressure results in a decrease of the equity
price. Empirical evidence from Masulis and Korwar (1986) and Asquith and Mullins
(1986) document a price drop about 2.5% upon the SEO announcement is made.
Following a similar vein in the earnings announcement hypothesis, if those
gambling-motivated investors are truly paying less attention to fundamentals and valuerelevant news when their demand for lottery stocks is at its peak, we also expect that they
will react less negatively to SEO announcements by lottery-type firms issued at the ToM,
and that managers of the lottery-type firms may be timing the issuance of SEOs to
coincide with high demand by lottery-type investors at the ToM.
Hypothesis 3: Price reaction to SEO announcements is weaker (less negative) for
lottery stocks issuing such announcements during the ToM.
Hypothesis 4: Managers are trying to time the SEO announcement during a
period when the local speculative retail investors’ demand for the stock is peaking, i.e., at
ToM
The role of marketing and the choice of marketing method (i.e., fully marketed vs.
accelerated) has drawn much attention in public offering literature. The marketing in the
equity issue can affect the offering price according to prior studies because it can attract
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more investor attention to a stock, especially those retail investors. Pre-IPO coverage
(Cook et al., 2006) and pre-IPO analyst reports (Chahine et al., 2008) are shown to be an
attention-grabbing and hype-creating tool that works effectively for retail investors,
increasing the offering price of the IPO. Huang and Zhang (2011) show that the number
of managing underwriter, a proxy of the total marketing efforts in an SEO, adversely
affects the offering price discount. Issuing firms generally face two choices of marketing
method. Fully marketed offer, which typically involves much underwriter’s marketing
efforts and a road show, can be used to achieve a higher offer price and after-issue stock
price by flattening the short-term demand curve of the issuer, but it comes at a cost of a
considerable amount of underwriter fee. Accelerated offer, on the other hand, typically
does not have a road show and can be completed much faster. The issuing firm may
choose the latter method if the costs outweigh the benefits. Gao and Ritter (2010) find
that the choice of marketing method in SEO (i.e., fully marketed offer vs. accelerated
offer) in fact affects the elasticity of the issuing firm’s demand curve. A fully marketed
offer is more attractive to a firm with an inelastic demand curve because marketing
flattens the demand curve and helps the firm obtain a higher offer price and post-issue
stock price.
Based on the previous finding that the demand curve for lottery-type stocks tends
to be flatter in areas whose demographic profile fits that of the typical lottery-ticket buyer
(Meng and Pantzalis, 2016), we hypothesize that lottery-type stocks issuing SEOs at the
ToM can save the direct marketing costs associate with fully marketed issues and aimed
at flattening the demand curve. Given the cyclicality in lottery-type stocks’ prices, the
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management of the firm may simply time the issue and choose an accelerated offer
method at the ToM to saving the costly marketing.
Hypothesis 5: Lottery-type firms are more likely to issue SEOs using the
accelerated offer method at the ToM than the rest of firms, especially in areas where
local investors’ demographic profiles resemble those of individuals who are typically
attracted to lottery-type investments.

3. Data
3.1 Lottery-Type Stocks and proxy for concentration of lottery stocks local investors
3.1.1 Lottery-Type Stocks
We first define and select the lottery-type stocks in the Center for Research in
Securities Prices (CRSP) universe from a sample period of 1980-2010, using the same
procedure that we applied in the related paper, Meng and Pantzalis (2016). Lottery-type
stocks in our sample have three main features, as suggested by Kumar (2009a): (i) low
stock price, i.e., “cheap bets”, (ii) high idiosyncratic volatility, i.e., “extreme return
events observed in the past are more likely to be repeated”, and (iii) high idiosyncratic
skewness, i.e., “occasionally generate extreme positive returns”.
We extract stock returns, trading volume, shares outstanding, and share price
information from CRSP. We then construct measures of stock price, idiosyncratic
volatility, and idiosyncratic skewness for each stock in each month. We define the stock
price at month t as the closing price at the end of the previous month (t-1). We compute
both idiosyncratic volatility and idiosyncratic skewness of each stock at the end of month
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t, based on information from a 6-month window prior to month t (month t – 6 to t – 1).
Following Kumar (2009a), idiosyncratic volatility of each stock at the end of month t is
measured by the variance of residual returns in the past six months (month t – 6 to t – 1),
where the residual returns are estimated from the four-factor model using daily stock
return time series over the period. Following Harvey and Siddique (2000) and Kumar
(2009a), we compute the idiosyncratic skewness as follows: we obtain residuals returns
by estimating regressions of daily stocks returns on excess market returns and the squared
excess market returns. Then we use a scaled measure of the third moment of the residual
as the idiosyncratic skewness.
Following Kumar (2009a)’s definition of lottery-type stocks, the stocks that are
in the lowest 50th stock price percentile, the highest 50th idiosyncratic volatility
percentile, and the highest 50th idiosyncratic skewness percentile are categorized as
lottery-type stocks. We use an indicator variable, Lottery, to specify the type of the stock
in the regression. It equals one if the stock is defined as lottery-type in our sample and
zero otherwise. The stocks that are in the highest 50th stock price percentile, the lowest
50th idiosyncratic volatility percentile, and the lowest 50th idiosyncratic skewness
percentile are categorized as nonlottery-type stocks. The remaining stocks in the CRSP
universe are categorized as other-type. We obtain 5059 lottery-type stocks and 17,062
number of nonlottery-type and other-type stocks in our final sample.
3.1.2 LSLI-Index
We use the following six characteristics of a typical lottery-type stock investor
documented by Kumar (2009a) to construct a measure of concentration of lottery-type
stock local investors: low levels of income and education, living in urban areas, being
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Catholic and belonging to the African-American or Hispanic minority groups. Each firm
in our sample is assigned to a county using its headquarter location information from
Compustat, following Coval and Moskowitz (1999) and Seasholes and Zhu (2010).
Urban is a dummy variable, which equals one if the firm's headquarter is located within
100 miles of one of the ten largest metropolitan areas of the U.S. and zero otherwise.
Religious profile data of all U.S counties are from the Association of Religion Data
Archives (ARDA). We calculate the ratio of Catholic population to Protestant population
(Catho/Prot) of each county in the U.S. and assign the corresponding county-level
religiosity measure to the firm’s county location. Education, Afri/Whi, and Income are
county- level local demographic measures using information from U.S. Census data.
Education is the percentage of residents in a county with a Bachelor’s or higher
educational degree. Afri/Whi is the proportion of the number of African-Americans to the
number of White-Americans in a county. Income is the median of annual household
income in a county. The three aforementioned variables related to local demographics
are constructed at the county level from information extracted from U.S. census and
assigned to all firms with headquarters in particular counties. Institutional ownership
information is from the Thomson Financial database. Following Bartov, et.al (2000), we
use the percentage of shares held by institutions, InstiOwn, to proxy investor
sophistication. Combining the aforementioned six variables, we construct the LotteryType Stock Local Investor Index as follows:
1

LSLI-Index = 6𝑁 [Rank(Catho/Prot)+Rank(AfrWhi)+Rank(-InstOwn)
1

+Rank(-Income)+ Rank(-Education)] + 6 Urban
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(1)

where N is the total number of observations and Rank( ) is a function that returns the rank
of the input variable. The intuition is that each of the six component variables contributes
equal weight in the index and that large value of LSLI-Index indicates high concentration
of lottery-type stock local investors in a county.
3.2 Sample Selection and Variable Measurement
3.2.1 Earnings Announcements
We obtain the quarterly earnings announcements for our sample firms from
Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S) and then include in our analysis only
those issued at the ToM. This process generates 59,598 ToM firm-earnings
announcements. We measure earnings surprise as FEi,q= (Ei,q– Fi,q)/Pi,q, where Ei,q is the
actual earnings per share announced in quarter q for firm i, Fi,q is the median of the most
recent forecasts from all individual analysts covering the stock, and Pi,q is the stock price
of firm i five trading days before the announcement in quarter q. We follow Livnat and
Mendenhall (2006) and calculate cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) as “the difference
between the firm’s daily return from CRSP and the daily return on the portfolio of firms
with the same size (the market value of equity from June) and book-to-market ratio (from
prior December).” CAR(0,1) and CAR(2,22) are defined for the trading days’ windows of
(0,1) and (2,22), capturing immediate reaction and delayed response, respectively. We
choose a shorter drift window (2, 22) than in other studies because a longer one would
overlap with the next ToM event window and therefore might produce contaminated
results. We rank announcements into earnings surprise quintiles and define the bottom
quintile (FE1) as bad earnings news and the top quintile (FE5) as good earnings news.
The spread in abnormal returns between the two extreme earnings surprise quintiles
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(FE5− FE1) measures the magnitude of the stock price response to extreme earnings
news; a larger spread indicates that investors have stronger reaction to earnings news on
the announcement date. We follow Hirshleifer et al. (2009) and construct several control
variables in the regression as follows: Analysts is the number of different analysts
covering the stock in a given fiscal year; Reporting Lag is the number of days between
the quarter-end and the date of announcements; InstOwn is the percentage of total shares
outstanding owned by 13F institution; Turnover is the monthly trading volume divided by
the number of shares outstanding; Earnings Volatility is the standard deviation during the
past 4 years of the deviations of quarterly earnings from 1-year-ago earnings; Earnings
Persistence is the past 4 years’ first-order autocorrelation coefficient of quarterly
earnings per share.
We follow Lakonishok and Smidt (1988) and define ToM trading days as the last
trading day of a month and first three trading days of the next month. We control for a
host of firm characteristics, such as size, book-to-market ratio, turnover, and leverage in
our regression analysis. Firm size is the fiscal quarter-end share price times the number of
shares outstanding; book-to-market ratio is the fiscal quarter-end firm’s book value of
common equity divided by firm’s size; volume turnover is the daily trading volume
divided by the number of shares outstanding; and the firm leverage is the fiscal quarterend firm’s book value of debt divided by the book value of total assets.
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3.2.2 Seasoned Equity Offering and Offer Method
SEO data are from the Thomson Financial Securities Data Company (SDC) new
issue database and covers the period from 1980 to 2010. The classification of offer
method, including accelerated bookbuilt and fully marketed offer, is also from SDC’s
new issue database. We exclude American Depository Receipts (ADRs), closed-end
funds, and Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) from our sample. We also require that
the issuing firm should have a regular common stock listing on CRSP and Compustat
during the announcement and offer period, i.e., at least a trading day before the
announcement to a trading day after the issue, in order to be included in the sample.
These criteria lead to a sample of 7,565 fully marketed offers and 1,174 accelerated offers.
The dependent variable in in our regression analysis of propensity to make
accelerated offer is a dummy variable for which accelerated offers equal one, and zero
otherwise.

The main independent variable is Lottery issuer@ToM, which equals one if the issuer is characterized as

lottery type firm and issue at the ToM, and zero otherwise.

We also control for a host of offer

characteristics in our regression analysis of propensity to make accelerated offer.
Proceeds is the total amount of capital raised from the SEO globally. Relative size is the
proportion of shares offered in the SEO to the total number of shares outstanding prior to
the issue. Fraction of primary shares is proportion of the number of primary shares to the
total number of shares offered. Analysts is the number of analysts covering the stock of
the issuer. Bid-ask spread (%) is the average difference between ask and bid prices,
divided by the midpoint of ask and bid prices over the 250 trading days prior to the
announcement date.
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4. Results: Evidence from Earnings Announcements
4.1 Post Earnings Announcement Drift (PEAD)
In this section, we deal with the issue of whether gambling-motivated investors’
capacity to process value-relevant information is compromised around the ToM and
investigate immediate and delayed price reactions to earning announcements issued
during the ToM period by both lottery-type stocks and the rest of stocks. If lottery-type
investors’ propensity to gamble in lottery stocks is coupled with attention deficit as is
often the case with different types of impulse control disorders, then they may be paying
less attention to fundamentals and value-relevant news when their demand for lottery
stocks is at its peak, i.e. at the ToM. Thus, we expect that in that case they will underreact
to earnings announcements by lottery-type firms issued at the ToM.
We report univariate statistics by type of stock (i.e. lottery vs. all others) of
immediate and delayed reaction to bad and good earnings surprises that occur at the turn
of month in Panel A of Table 2.1. We also report immediate and delayed reactions to
earnings surprises for the highest- and the lowest- LSLI-Index tercile subsamples in Panel
B. Also reported are the spreads (FE5 –FE1) and the differences in the magnitude of
reaction between lottery and all other stocks. Despite the fact that both groups of firms
display significant immediate reaction and PEAD, “Lottery-type” stocks display
significantly smaller CAR(0,1) spread (weaker immediate reaction) and larger CAR(2,22)
spread (stronger delayed response) than the rest of the firms. Lottery-type stocks have a
mean spread of 2.85% in 2-day cumulative announcement returns (CAR(0, 1)) whereas
for the rest of the firms the mean spread is 3.31%, indicating that immediate reaction is
weaker for lottery-type firms than for the rest of firms. Accordingly, we observe a reverse
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trend in spread with respect to the delayed response: Lottery-type stocks are associated
with stronger PEAD and have a mean spread of 3.44% in PEAD (CAR(2, 22)) whereas
for the rest of the firms the mean spread is 1.99%. The differences in mean spread of both
event windows are statistically significant at the 5%- and 10%- levels, respectively.
Panel B reports the univariate statistics of immediate reaction and PEAD for the
highest- and the lowest- LSLI-Index tercile subsamples. By dividing the sample into two
subsamples by terciles of LSLI-Index, we investigate whether this weaker immediate
reaction and stronger delayed response to earnings announcements by lottery stocks at the
turn of month are mainly associated with large concentrations of gamblers in the local
area. The results in Panel B support our prediction. The previous results from Panel A
only hold for firms located in areas with high concentration of lottery-type stock local
investors. In contrast, no clear pattern can be observed when the concentration of lotterytype stock local investors is low. The results provide evidence that the underreaction to
earnings news at the turn of the month is more pronounced in geographic areas with high
concentration of lottery-type investors. In addition, the evidence is consistent with the
notion that such investors behave like gamblers, who are considered less sophisticated
and pay less attention to firm fundamentals.
We further investigate the market reaction to lottery EAs at the ToM in a
multivariate setting in order to control for a host of variables that are known to explain
announcement period returns. We follow the model specification in Hirshleifer et al.
(2009) and include firm size, book-to-market, log (1 + # Analysts), Reporting Lag,
institutional ownership (IO), Earnings Volatility, Earnings Persistence, Share Turnover,
and indicator variables for year, month, day of week, and Fama-French 10 industry
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classification in our regression. All control variables are interacted with FE. The model
specification is as follows:
CAR = β0 + β1 FE + β2ToM + β3 (FE × ToM) + ∑ήiXi + ∑ βi(FE × Xi) + ε.
Where, ToM is an indicator variable that equals one if earnings announcement is issued
during the ToM, and =0 if issued during the non-ToM part of the month. Xi is a vector of
the aforementioned control variables.
Table 2.2 presents regression results relating 2-day announcement abnormal
returns (CAR[0,1]) and 21-day announcement abnormal returns (CAR[2,22]) with the
earnings surprise quintile ranks, ToM indicator variable and other controls. Columns 1-6
report the regression results on of lottery-type firms by two event windows and by LSLIIndex rankings. Not surprisingly, the coefficient estimates of FE (FE=1, extremely bad
news; FE=5, extremely good news) are positive and significant throughout, suggesting
that good news from the earnings announcements typically generate positive immediate
and delayed price reactions. The coefficient estimates of ToM, which captures the impact
of issuing earnings news during ToM period on the announcement abnormal returns, are
insignificant throughout, indicating that the timing of earnings announcements by either
lottery-type firms or (all?) other firms does not affect the price reaction significantly. Of
particular interest to us is the coefficient estimate of FE*ToM, which tells us whether
investors underreact to earnings announcements by lottery-type firms issued at the ToM
as documented in the univariate tests. For the announcement returns (CAR[0,1]) of
lottery-type firms, FE*ToM is negative and significant in the full sample and highest
LSLI-Index tercile subsample, indicating that the immediate market reaction is less
sensitive to earnings news issued by lottery-type firms at the ToM. However, FE*ToM
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becomes positive and significant in the highest LSLI-Index tercile subsample for the postannouncement returns (CAR[2,22]) of lottery-type firms (Column 5), suggesting a more
sensitive delayed market reaction to earnings news issued by lottery-type firms at the
ToM. This pattern, consisting of a muted immediate reaction and a delayed response
thereafter, provides support for the view that lottery-type stock investors underreact to
fundamentals’ information at the ToM.
4.2 Propensity to Issue Earnings Announcement at the ToM
It is noteworthy that earnings announcement issuances at the turn of month
previously shown in Table 2.1 seem to be heavily skewed toward bad news in the case of
“lottery-type” firms, but not so for all other firms issuing earnings at the ToM. For
“lottery-type” firms, the number of bad news issued at the turn of month is 3,724 whereas
the number of good news issued at the same period is only 3,058. For the rest of firms,
the number of good news issued at the turn of month is 8,230 whereas the number of bad
news issued at the same period is only 7,564. Thus, it is possible that management of
“lottery-type” firms might be timing the date of bad news announcements to lessen its
negative impact on stock price, i.e., they are more likely to issue bad earnings news at the
turn of month than those of the rest of firms.
Table 2.3 shows the summary statistics of the frequency (number) and percentage
of EAs issued during the ToM and non-ToM sections of a month by lottery firms and also
by all other firms, as well as the distribution of EAs by FE quintile, again for the ToM
and non-ToM periods, and for lottery and all others. The total number of announcements
is 59,598 in our sample, 16,820 of which are issued by lottery-type firms, and 42,778 are
issued by the rest of firms. Since the number of lottery-type firms is much lower than that
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of the rest of firms, we start our analysis by comparing the percentage of announcements
issued by lottery-type firms and that issued by rest of firms at different time periods (i.e.,
ToM vs. non-ToM). In the full sample results, 22.14% of the announcements issued by
the lottery-type firms are classified as bad news (i.e., FE1), while only 18.18% of the
announcements issued by the lottery-type firms are classified as good news (i.e., FE5).
Moreover, lottery-type firms also issue a higher percentage of bad news than rest of the
firms (22.14% vs. 18.18%). Both differences are statistically significant at 10% level.
The univariate results suggest that not only do lottery-type firms issue more bad news
than good news, but they also issue more bad news than the rest of firms do. As for the
subsample results, we find this pattern exists in the ToM period and not in non-ToM
period, indicating that the lottery-type firms’ propensity to issue more bad earnings news
than good earnings news, and their propensity to issue more bad earnings news than the
rest of the firms do, are likely to be driven bymanagement viewing the ToM as a window
of opportunity.
Since the percentage of earnings announcements issued at ToM is much lower
than that issued at non-ToM in nature (non-ToM period has more trading days than ToM
period, and hence more earnings announcements issuance), we show the daily average
number of earnings announcements and daily average percentage number of earnings
announcements for lottery-type firms, as well as rest of the firms, to produce a direct
comparison between the ToM and non-ToM columns. We find that lottery-type firms
issue a significantly greater proportion of their total number of bad earnings news on a
given day during the ToM period (0.0133%) than non-ToM period (0.0093%), while the
rest of the firms do not seem to exhibit any preference for the timing of the issuance
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(0.0097% for ToM period vs. 0.0099% for non-ToM period. Overall, the results in Table
2.3 provide evidence in line with the view that management of “lottery-type” firms might
be taking advantage of investors’ underreaction to negative earnings news and time the
date of bad news announcements.
In a multivariate setting, we use an ordered probit model with the earnings
surprise rank quintiles (FE) as the dependent variable, which is an ordinal variable with
five possible outcomes, and controlling for other firm characteristics. We perform
subsample tests using the same regression model for the top- and bottom- LSLI-Index
terciles, in order to examine whether the propensity to issue bad news is more
pronounced for firms located in areas with high concentration of “gamblers”.
Table 2.4 presents the regression results for the full sample, as well as the topand bottom- LSLI-Index terciles’ subsamples. In the full sample test, the coefficient
estimate of Lottery, which is the main variable of interest, is negative and significant at
10% level, indicating that lottery-type firms are more likely to issue bad news at the ToM.
The magnitude of the coefficient is -0.051, suggesting that if use predicted probabilities
for FE=0, the probability of a lottery-type firm to issue bad news at the turn of month is
0.180 while the probability of any other firm to issue bad news at the turn of month is
0.141,Once again, the coefficient estimate of Lottery remains significant (and negative)
only in the highest-LSLI-Index tercile subsample, indicating that propensity to issue bad
news is especially strong for lottery firms in areas where there is greater likelihood of
existence of “gamblers”. This finding is also consistent with the notion that lottery firms’
management may be strategically choosing to time the issuance of bad news at the ToM
when local investors are least attentive of fundamentals-related news.
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4.3 Trading Strategies
Meng and Pantzalis (2016) find that the trading strategy utilizing the
outperformance (underperformance) of lottery-type stocks at the ToM (non-ToM periods)
earns abnormal returns and is potentially exploitable for practitioners. The trading
strategy we apply here aims at taking advantage of the underreaction of lottery-type
stocks to both good news and bad news at the turn of month for the purpose of showing
the impact of ToM earnings announcements on the profits of the arbitrage portfolio.
Specifically, this trading strategy is established during every ToM period and entails a
zero net investment portfolio that consists of a long position in all lottery-type stocks with
good news (FE5) and a short position in all lottery-type stocks with bad news (FE1). We
then hold each of these stocks in the portfolio for 20 days, i.e. until the next ToM at
which point we re-balance the portfolio. We then estimate the risk-adjusted performance
of this arbitrage portfolio using the four-factor model (Fama and French (1993); Carhart
(1997)) and daily returns and present the results in Table 2.5.
Column 1 of Table 2.5 reports the coefficient estimates of the four-factor
regression model for the full sample portfolio. The alpha is positive and significant at the
5% level with the magnitude of 0.055, indicating that our arbitrage portfolio’s riskadjusted daily return is 5.5 basis points, which corresponds to about 14.0% per year. We
also form the arbitrage portfolios for the areas with high and low concentration of lotterystock local investors. Since we have shown previously that the underreaction to earnings
news is especially pronounced for lottery-type stocks in the areas with high concentration
of “gamblers”, we expect our trading strategy to work in those areas but not necessarily
in areas where investors do not display strong gambling preference. Columns 2 and 3
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report the coefficient estimates of the four-factor regression model for the subsample
portfolios in areas with many (high LSLI-Index) and few (low LSLI-Index) gamblers,
respectively. The alpha estimate is positive and significant with the magnitude of 0.059 in
Column 2, while it is not significant in Column 3. The results indicate that while the
trading strategy is still profitable for the portfolio that only includes firms located in the
high concentration of lottery-stock local investors, it fails to outperform the regressionbased benchmark for the portfolio that only includes firms located in areas with few
investors that fit the profile of a lottery-type stock investor.

5. Results: Evidence from seasoned equity offering
5.1 Price Reaction to SEO Announcements
As part of the body of evidence supporting the notion that lottery-type investors
tend to underreact to fundamentals-relate information at the ToM, we test the hypothesis
that reaction to SEO announcements is weaker (less negative) for lottery stocks issuing
such announcements during the ToM.
Table 2.6 shows the summary statistics of the announcement abnormal returns of
SEOs in our sample. The total number of SEO announcements is 1,089, 212 of which are
issued by lottery-type firms, and 877 are issued by rest of firms. Not surprisingly, market
reacts negatively to SEO announcement issue by both type of firms, irrespectively of the
location of the firms in our sample. However, firms located in areas with high
concentration of lottery-type stock local investors display significantly smaller CAR(0,1)
than the rest of the firms. Lottery-type stocks have a mean CAR(0,1) of -1.97% whereas
for the rest of the firms the mean is -2.31%, indicating a more pronounced underreaction
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for lottery-type firms than for the rest of firms, similar to what we document in the
earnings announcement issuance. Accordingly, we observe a reverse trend in abnormal
returns with respect to the delayed response: Lottery-type stocks are associated with
stronger PEAD and have a mean post-announcement abnormal returns (CAR [2,22]) of 1.26 % whereas for the rest of the firms the mean post-announcement abnormal returns is
-0.94%. The difference in PEAD is statistically significant at the 10%- level. This is in
line with the notion that investors who like to gamble in the stock market are considered
less sophisticated and pay less attention to firm fundamentals.
We then analyze lottery-type stocks weaker underreaction to SEO announcement
in a multivariate framework to ensure that what we have documented in the univariate
tests is not driven by certain firm characteristics. Table 2.7 presents regression results of
with the lottery-type stock indicator variable and other controls on 2-day announcement
abnormal returns (Column 1-3) and 21-day announcement abnormal returns (Column 46). The results show that the weaker underreaction to SEO announcement for lottery-type
stocks still holds after controlling for firm size, book-to-market ratio, turnover, and
leverage. For the announcement returns (CAR[0,1]), the coefficient estimate of lottery is
positive and significant in the high LSLI-Index subsample but is insignificant in the full
sample and low LSLI-Index subsample, indicating that price of the lottery-type stocks
reacts less negatively to SEO announcements compared to other stocks in the market. We
observe an opposite effect of being an lottery-type stock on the post-announcement
period returns (CAR[2,22]). The coefficient estimate of lottery is negative and significant
only in the high LSLI-Index subsample, indicating that price of the lottery-type stocks
reacts less negatively to SEO announcements compared to other stocks in the market.
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Overall, the results provide extra evidence that lottery-type investors’ may be paying less
attention to fundamentals and value-relevant news when their demand for lottery stocks is
at its peak, i.e. at the ToM and underreact to corporate announcements at the turn of
month.
5.2 SEO Trading Strategies
We have found that the underreaction of SEO announcements of lottery-type
stocks at the turn of month seems to be more pronounced in areas where there is high
concentration of lottery stock local investors. We also provided evidence that high
concentration of this type of investor in an area is associated with a stronger drift of local
lottery-type stocks in the post-announcement period. Thus, in our second trading strategy,
we consider an arbitrage portfolio formed by shorting all lottery-type stocks that issue
SEO announcements at the ToM and long other stocks that issue SEO announcements at
the ToM on each trading days of each ToM period, and hold the portfolio until the end of
the non-ToM period of the next month. We then estimate the risk-adjusted performance
of this arbitrage portfolio using the four-factor model (Fama and French (1993); Carhart
(1997)) and daily returns.
Table 2.8 presents the coefficient estimates of the time series regression for the
full sample first, then by deciles of LSLI-index. In column 1, which includes all stocks
that have SEO issuance in our sample period, the coefficient of the constant term, the
portfolio’s alpha, is positive but insignificant, indicating that this arbitrage portfolio does
not seem to generate abnormal returns that outperform the benchmark. In column 2, we
only lottery-type stocks located in areas with high concentration of “gambler”. This
arbitrage portfolio could be potentially more profitable because of the evidence suggested
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in the previous table, i.e., lottery stocks have a weaker underreaction to SEO
announcement and stronger drift in the post-announcement period. In Column 2, the
coefficient estimate of the portfolio’s alpha is 0.033 and significant at the 10% level,
indicating that our new arbitrage portfolio’s abnormal performance is 33 basis points on a
daily basis or about 8.5% per year. As expected, this arbitrage portfolio generates more
profits compared to the previous one that includes all SEOs. For the purpose of showing
the impact of local investors’ demographic features on the price reactions to SEO
announcements, we also use the same trading strategy except that we only include stocks
that are located in the low LISI-index areas, and present the results in Column 3. The
magnitude of the coefficient estimate of the portfolio’s alpha drops to 0.008 and becomes
insignificant, suggesting that the arbitrage portfolio is no longer profitable for those
stocks that attract less attention from investors with gambling propensity.
5.3 SEO Offer Method
Having discussed the importance of gambling-motivated investors on corporate
earnings announcements, we turn our attention to the offer method of SEO and further
explore the corporate strategies of the lottery-type firms. If the pre-offer demand curve
for lottery-type stocks at the ToM tends to be flatter in areas whose demographic fits that
of the typical lottery-ticket buyer (Meng and Pantzalis, 2016), then fully marketed offer
might not so attractive to lottery stocks whose demand curve at the ToM is more elastic.
Thus, we expect that there are a greater number of accelerated offers by lottery-type firm
at the ToM.
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5.3.1 Summary Statistics
We report number of SEOs by type of stock (i.e. lottery vs. all others) of two
choices of offering method (i.e. fully marketed vs. accelerated) that occur at the turn of
month in Table 2.9. In our sample, there are a total of 8,379 SEOs with 7,565 fully
marketed offers and 1,174 accelerated offers. Not surprisingly, most of the issuing firms
in our sample are considered nonlottery-type or other firms (82.90%) coupled with
relatively few number of lottery-type firms (17.10%). In addition, both groups of firms do
not display greater likelihood of issuing accelerated offers during the non-ToM period.
What is more interesting in the table is the difference in proportions of firms that issue
accelerated offers at the ToM for lottery-type stocks and the rest. Although nonlottery
and other type of firms choose to issue statistically similar proportion of accelerated
offers (about 10%) during ToM period, lottery-type firms exhibit significantly greater
propensity to make speed offers at the ToM than the rest of the firms: 5.03% for lotterytype stocks and 2.02% for the rest of the firms, with a difference statistically significant
at the 5 % level.
5.3.2 Propensity to Issue Accelerated Offer
Having established that issuing at the ToM changes the elasticity of the issuing
firm’s stock, we further investigate the case by testing whether the management of
“lottery-type” firms opportunistically times the offering date to take advantage of the flat
demand curve, i.e., they are more likely to issue accelerated offer at the turn of month
than those of the rest of firms. We follow Gao and Ritter (2010) and use a binomial
logistic model with a dependent variable, Acce_offer, which is an indicator variable that
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equals one if the SEO is an accelerated offer and zero otherwise. Specifically, we
estimate the following regression model:
Prob (Acce_offer) =

1
1+𝑒 −𝑢

, where u= β0 + β1 Lot_issue_ToM + β2 Ln(MktCap) +

β3Relative_Size + β4Primary shares fraction + β5 Ln(1+ # of Analysts) +β6 Bid-ask spread
+ β7 Ln(Elasticity) + ε

(4)

Besides the full sample test, we perform subsample tests including only the top- or
bottom- LSLI-Index terciles to examine whether the propensity to issue accelerated offer
is more pronounced for firms located in areas with high concentration of “gamblers”.
Table 2.10 reports the regression results. In Column 1, the coefficient estimate of
main variable of interest, “Lottery” issuer @ ToM is positive and significant at the 10%
level, indicating that the Lottery-type issuers tend to be more likely to issue accelerated
offer at the ToM. In the subsamples’ test the coefficient of “Lottery” issuer @ ToM is
positive and significant in the highest LSLI-Index tercile group (High-LISI area, hereafter)
but it becomes insignificant in the lowest LSLI-Index tercile group (Low-LISI area,
hereafter). This result is in line with our prediction that the management might be aware
of the increase in demand for stocks of firms located in areas with high concentration of
lottery-type stock local investors and opportunistically issue accelerated offer to save the
marketing cost, while the management of firms in the areas with low concentration of
lottery-type stock local investors are unlikely to time the issue of accelerated offer.
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6. Conclusion
As an extension study of the work by Meng and Pantzalis (2016), this paper investigates
the impact of the outperformance of lottery-type stocks at the ToM in the U.S. stock
market on major corporate event announcements, such as quarterly earnings
announcements and seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). The two questions addressed in
this study are: first, are lottery type investors underreacting to value-relevant information
around the turn-of-the-month? And, second, are corporate managers aware of this, i.e. are
they using the ToM as a window of opportunity when they issue bad news?
We show that investors tend to underreact to earnings announcements, as well as
SEO announcements issued by lottery stocks at the ToM, consistent with the notion that
lottery-type stock investors tend to pay little attention to fundamentals at the ToM. In line
with the psychology literature’s view that impulse control disorders (such as gambling)
are associated with inattention, we show that underreaction to earnings news and SEO
announcements at ToM occurs exclusively in the case of lottery-type firms located in
areas with high concentration of investors whose demographic profile fits that of lottery
ticket buyers (i.e. “gamblers”). Moreover, we find that management of the lottery-type
stock have greater propensity to issue bad earning news and SEO announcements during
ToM, partly driven by the motivation to lessen the negative price impact followed by
those corporate events. The trading strategies that aim at taking advantage of the
underreaction of lottery-type stocks to earnings news and SEO announcements at the turn
of month generates abnormal returns that significantly outperform the benchmark.
We also examine the implication of the outperformance of lottery-type stock in
the offer method that firm use in the corporate SEOs.
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We show that the likelihood of

issuing accelerated offer at the turn of month is significantly greater than that of the rest
of firms. These findings indicate that issuing lottery-type stocks at the ToM might
potentially save the direct marketing costs of the issuing firm because it flattens the
elasticity of pre-offer demand curve.
Our paper contributes to the existing literature of lottery-type stocks in the market
and provides implication on corporate events and policy. First, we use demographics to
empirically gauge retail investor behavior which helps us understand the behavior and
judgment biases of gamblers as it relates to financial investments. This is done using the
paradigm of lottery-type stock investors and their reaction to earnings news around the
time when they are most likely to gamble (i.e. at the ToM). Second, we provide
preliminary evidence in line with the view that corporate managers of lottery-type firms
may be timing the issuance of bad earnings news in order to take advantage of an acutely
inattentive local investor clientele at the ToM. Finally, our evidence provides insights on
the issue of SEOs of lottery-type stocks at the ToM and its strategic implications on
corporate policy.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Brief Definitions and Sources of Main Variables
Variable

Definition

Panel A: Stock Characteristics
Idiosyncratic
Standard deviation of the residual estimates calculated by fitting four factors model
Volatility

Source

CRSP

Idiosyncratic
Skewness

Third moment of the residual obtained by fitting the daily stock returns on a two-factor model

CRSP

Price

End-of-month stock price

CRSP

Past Return

Monthly stock return during the past 12 months

CRSP

Size

End of month share price times the number of shares outstanding

CRSP

BM

End of month firm’s book value divided by firm’s size

Age

Number of years the firm has existed in the CRSP database

CRSP

Analyst

Number of different analysts covering the stock in a given fiscal quarter

I/B/E/S

Compustat

Panel B:Variables Used in Regressions
Ret (%)

Daily stock returns on all trading days

CRSP

Ret_ToM (%)

Daily stock returns on ToM trading days, the last and first three trading days of the month

CRSP

Non_Ret (%)

Daily stock returns on rest of the month, i.e., excluding ToM trading days

CRSP

Lottery

A lottery-type stock indicator variable which equals one if the stock is clasified as lottery-type stock and
zero otherwise

CRSP

Size

Fiscal quarter-end share price times the number of shares outstanding

CRSP

BM

Fiscal quarter-end firm’s book value divided by firm’s size

Compustat

Leverage

Fiscal quarter-end firm’s book value of debt divided by book value of total assets

Compustat

Turnover

Daily trading volume divided by the number of shares outstanding

Friday

An indicator variable equals one if the trading day falls on a Friday and zero otherwise
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CRSP

Weekend

An indicator variable equals one if the four ToM trading days interval includes a weekend and zero
otherwise

Low_prc

An indicator variable if the stock in the lowest 50th stock price percentile and zero otherwise

CRSP

High_skew

An indicator variable if the stock is in the highest 50th idiosyncratic volatility percentile and zero otherwise

CRSP

High_idio

An indicator variable if the stock is in the highest 50th idiosyncratic skewness percentile and zero otherwise

CRSP

InstOwn

Percentage of total shares outstanding owned by 13F institution

Urban

Mortality

Catho/Prot

Equals one if the firm's headquarter is located within 100 miles of one of the ten largest metropolitan areas
of the U.S.
Adjusted average of daily mortality rate in the county where the firm is located. The CDC dataset includes
complete daily death counts information for the early part of our sample, i.e. from 1980 till 1988. However,
starting with 1989 it does not report daily counts of deaths by date, but instead provides total counts for
each month and average count for each day of the week within a month across all counties in the United
States. Thus, for the period 1989-2010 our measure of the change of mortality rate (ΔMortality) of each
county at the turn of month is merely an estimate based on a six-day window that includes the last three
days of a month and the first three days of the next month, denoted by Day(i), i=-3,-2,-1,1,2,3. The
mortality rate of this county on each day of this six-day window is denoted by Mor(i), i=-3,-2,-1,1,2,3.
Since we do not have mortality information by date, we use the average mortality rate for that month and in
that county for each particular day of the week corresponding to the day of the aforementioned six-day
window. For example, if the first day of the month t, Day(1), is a Tuesday then we use the average daily
mortality rate on Tuesdays in that county for month t as Mor(1). That would mean that the last day of the
previous month t-1, Day (-1) would be a Monday. Therefore for Mor(-1) we would insert the average death
rate on Mondays in the county for month t-1. Following the same procedure, we would fill in the values for
Mor(-2), Mor(2), Mor(-3), and Mor(3). The approximated change in mortality rate at the turn of a month for
a given county is thus calculated as follows:
ΔMortality ={[Mor(1)- Mor(-1)] + [Mor(2)- Mor(-2)] + [Mor(3)- Mor(-3)]}
Population of Catholics over the population of Protestants in the county where
the firm is located

13F
U.S. Census

CDC

ARDA

Education

Percentage of residents with a Bachelor’s or higher educational degree on county level

U.S. Census

AfriWhi

The number of African-American over number of White American residents on
county level

U.S. Census

Income

Median of annual household on county level

U.S. Census

LSLI

Lottery stock local investor Index-"LSLI-index" defined as: 5/6*[1/5*1/N*Rank(Catho/Prot)+
Rank(AfrWhi)-Rank(InstOwn)-Rank(Income)-Rank(Education)] + 5/6*Urban Dummy, where N is the total
number of observations and Rank() is a function that returns the rank of variable.

U.S. Census,
CDC, 13F,
ARDA

EBSI

Excess buy-sell imbalance

Brokerage
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Split

An indicator variable which equals one for all trading days after the stock split and
zero for all days prior to the stock split

Outage

An indicator variable which equals one if the firm is located in the blackout area, and zero otherwise.

80

CRSP
EIA

Appendix B: Identification Tests – Power outage and headquarter changes
This table examines the effect of power outage and headquarter change on stock returns. Column 1-3 show the results for power outage test. We follow Shive (2012) and define ‘‘outage
period’’ as the first full business day of the outage. To be included in the sample, a power outage needs to affect 100,000 customers or more with a specified blackout area. The regression
model follows the specification of Column 3 in Table 1.2, with the addition of Outage indicator as well as its interactions with Lottery and ToM. Outage equals one if the firm is located in the
blackout area, and zero otherwise. Column 4-9 show the results for headquarter change test. The regression model follows the specification of Column 3 in Table 1.2, except that we replace
the main variable of interest with two indicators of headquarter change, HQIn and HQOut, in Column 4-6 and 7-9 respectively. HQIn equals one if a firm moves from a Low-LISI area to a
High-LISI area, and zero otherwise. HQOut equals one if a firm moves from a High-LISI area to a Low-LISI area and zero otherwise. These two indicator variables are lagged 1-2 years in
Column 5-6 and Column 8-9, respectively. Definitions of all variables are listed in Appendix A. In all specifications, coefficient estimates of control variables are omitted for brevity. Both
industry and time dummies are included, but coefficient estimates are suppressed for brevity as well. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics calculated using robust standard errors adjusted by
heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm and the day level. ***, **, * indicate a two-tailed test significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Dependent Variable

Daily stock returns %
Full Sample

T3 (Highest)

T1 ( Lowest)

Lag = 0

Lag = 1

Lag = 2

Lag = 0

Lag = 1

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

ToM

0.016**

0.015**

0.019***

0.016**

0.015**

0.019***

0.015**

0.014**

0.013**

(2.02)

(2.32)

(2.85)

(2.02)

(2.32)

(2.85)

(2.03)

(2.35)

(2.15)

Lottery

-0.021**

-0.025***

-0.018**

-0.019**

-0.021**

-0.017**

-0.014**

-0.013*

-0.019**

(-2.28)

(-2.69)

(-2.00)

(-2.26)

(-1.99)

(-2.10)

(-2.22)

(-1.90)

(-2.22)

Lottery*ToM

0.017**

0.022**

0.010*

0.031***

0.022**

0.010*

0.022**

0.015*

0.011*

(2.07)

(2.36)

(1.77)

(3.10)

(2.36)

(1.77)

(2.13)

(1.90)

(1.72)

Outage
Lottery*Outage
ToM*Outage
Lottery*ToM*Outage
HQIn
Lottery*HQIn
HQIN*ToM

-0.009*

-0.007

-0.006

(-1.78)

(-1.14)

(-1.36)

0.003

-0.005

0.001

(0.88)

(-0.14)

(0.36)

0.002

-0.002

0.001

(0.28)

(-1.00)

(0.25)

-0.0014**

-0.016***

-0.007

(-2.28)

(-2.94)

(-0.76)
0.003

0.002

0.002

(0.42)

(0.33)

(0.20)

0.002

-0.004

0.004

(0.85)

(-1.11)

(1.08)

0.004

0.003

0.006

(1.07)

(1.11)

(1.23)
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Lag = 2

Appendix B (Continued)
Lottery*ToM*HQIn

-0.002

0.004

0.018**

(-0.79)

(1.45)

(2.09)

HQOut
Lottery*HQOut

-0.003

-0.002

-0.003

(0.80)

(-1.09)

(1.09)

HQOUT*ToM

0.001

-0.005

0.002

(0.67)

(-1.18)

(0.77)

Lottery*ToM*HQOut

-0.002

-0.007*

-0.020***

(-0.86)

(-1.76)

(-2.83)

Observations
Adj. R-squared

17,337,825

17,337,825

17,337,825

17,337,825

17,337,825

17,337,825

17,337,825

17,337,825

17,337,825

0.0212

0.0205

0.0208

0.0142

0.0143

0.0185

0.0161

0.0150

0.0222

Controls

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Time Dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Industry Dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes
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Table 2.1 CARs by types of issuing stocks
This table shows the average 2-day excess announcement-period returns CAR(0,1) and 21-day excess announcement-period returns CAR(2,22) for extreme earnings surprise
quintiles (FE5: good news, FE1: bad news) at the turn of month by types of stocks. We measure earnings surprise as FE i,q= (Ei,q– Fi,q)/Pi,q, where Ei,q is the actual earnings per share
announced in quarter q for firm i, Fi,q is the median of the most recent forecasts from all individual analysts covering the stock, and P i,q is the stock price of firm i five trading days
before the announcement in quarter q. Day 0 represents the day of earnings announcement in all CAR event window definitions. Cumulative abnormal returns are based on a
single-factor market model estimated from day -255 to -46 for each sample firm, using the CRSP value-weighted index. Panel A shows the overall sample results and Panel B
shows the subsample results by terciles of LSLI-Index. ***, **, * indicate statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.

Panel A
CAR(0,1)
Type of Stocks
Lottery (1)
Nonlottery & Other (2)
Difference (1) - (2)

CAR(2,22)

FE1

FE5

FE5-FE1

FE1

FE5

FE5-FE1

-1.27%**
n=3724
-1.34%**
n=7564
0.07%

1.58%**
n=3058
1.97%***
n=8230
-0.39%

2.85%***

-1.64%***
n=3724
-1.04%**
n=7564
-0.60%*

1.88%***
n=3058
0.95%**
n=8230
0.93%**

3.44%***

3.31%***
-0.46%**

1.99%***
1.53%**

Panel B
T3: Highest LSLI-Index Tercile
CAR(0,1)
Type of Stocks
Lottery (1)
Nonlottery & Other (2)
Difference (1) - (2)

CAR(2,22)

FE1

FE5

FE5-FE1

FE1

FE5

FE5-FE1

-1.33%***
n=1228
-1.87%***
n=2528
0.44%

1.82%***
n=1127
2.83%***
n=2629
-1.01%**

2.45%***

1.50%***
n=1127
0.86%***
n=2629
0.64%

3.84%***

-1.44%**

-2.34%***
n=1228
-1.13%***
n=2528
-1.21%**

FE5-FE1

FE1

3.89%***

1.99%***
1.85%***

T1: Lowest LSLI-Index Tercile
CAR(0,1)
Type of Stocks

FE1

FE5

CAR(2,22)

Table 2.1 (Continued)
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FE5

FE5-FE1

Lottery (1)
Nonlottery & Other (2)
Difference (1) - (2)

-1.60%***
n=1298
-1.70%***
n=2507
0.10%

2.04%***
n=1120
2.45%***
n=2685
-0.41%

3.64%***
4.15%***
-0.41%
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-1.49%**
n=1298
-1.24%***
n=2507
-0.25%

2.03%***
n=1120
1.92%***
n=2685
0.09%

3.52%***
3.16%***
-0.36%

Table 2.2 Market reaction to EAs: ToM vs. Non-ToM
This table tests whether the reaction of lottery EAs at ToM is relatively weaker than the reaction to lottery EAs during non-ToM times. The dependent variable is the average 2-day excess
announcement-period returns CAR(0,1) in Column 1-3 and 21-day excess announcement-period returns CAR(2,22) in Column 4-6, respectively. We follow the model specification in Hirshleifer et al.
(2009). We measure earnings surprise as FEi,q= (Ei,q– Fi,q)/Pi,q, where Ei,q is the actual earnings per share announced in quarter q for firm i, Fi,q is the median of the most recent forecasts from all
individual analysts covering the stock, and Pi,q is the stock price of firm i five trading days before the announcement in quarter q. Control variables include firm size, book-to-market, log (1 + #
Analysts), Reporting Lag, institutional ownership (IO), Earnings Volatility, Earnings Persistence, Share Turnover, and indicator variables for year, month, day of week, and Fama-French 10 industry
classification. All control variables are interacted with FE. Standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustering by the day of announcement are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

Lottery-type Firms
CAR(0,1)

CAR(2,22)

Full Sample

T3(Highest )

T1(Lowest)

Full Sample

T3(Highest )

T1(Lowest)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.423***

0.307***

0.423***

0.286***

0.311***

0.214***

(3.78)

(4.43)

(7.69)

0.033

0.005

0.008

(4.83)
0.018

(3.56)
-0.029

(2.69)
-0.041

(1.00)

(0.41)

(0.28)

(0.68)

(-0.78)

(-1.11)

-0.007**

-0.012*

-0.004

0.017

0.018*

0.010

(-2.22)

(-1.86)

(-0.75)

(0.36)

(1.78)

(0.64)

0.041

0.062

0.451**

0.041

0.062

0.451**

(0.90)

(0.36)

(2.41)

(0.90)

(0.36)

(2.41)

Observations

13,625

4,587

4,421

13,625

4,587

4,421

R-squared

0.021

0.016

0.023

0.035

0.028

0.030

Industry Dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Time Dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Controls, interacted with FE

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

FE

ToM

FE*ToM

Constant
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Table 2.3 Propensity of earnings announcement issuance
This table shows the # and percentage of EAs issued during the ToM and non-ToM periods of a month by lottery firms and also by all other firms, as well as the daily average #
and daily average percentage of EAs issued during the ToM and non-ToM periods. Distribution of EAs by FE quintile, again for the ToM and non-ToM periods, by lottery vs. all
others, is also provided. Earning announcements that have earnings surprise ranks in the highest forecast error quintile are classified as FE5. Earning announcements that have
earnings surprise ranks in the lowest forecast error quintile are classified as FE1. ***, **, * indicate a mean difference t-test significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.

All
# (1)
All

Lottery

Nonlottery

Difference

% (2)

# (3)

% (4)

ToM
Avg. Daily
# (5)

Avg. Daily
% (6)

# (7)

% (8)

Non-ToM
Avg. Daily
# (9)

Avg. Daily
% (10)

Difference
Col (6) (10)

Announcements (1)

59,598

100%

8,534

14.32%

6.03

0.0101%

51,064

85.68%

5.89

0.0099%

0.0003%

FE1 (2)

11,288

18.94%

1,490

13.20%

1.05

0.0093%

7,295

86.80%

0.84

0.0100%

-0.0007%

FE5 (3)

11,288

18.94%

1,534

14.03%

1.08

0.0096%

7,297

85.97%

0.84

0.0099%

-0.0003%

Announcements (4)

16,820

100%

2,256

13.41%

1.59

0.0095%

14,564

86.59%

1.68

0.0100%

-0.0005%

FE1 (5)

3,724

22.14%

701

18.82%

0.50

0.0133%

3,023

81.18%

0.35

0.0093%

0.0040%**

FE5 (6)

3,058

18.18%

411

13.44%

0.29

0.0095%

2,647

86.56%

0.31

0.0100%

-0.0005%

Announcements (7)

42,778

100%

6,278

14.68%

4.44

0.0104%

36,500

85.32%

4.21

0.0098%

0.0006%

FE1 (8)

7,864

18.38%

1,079

13.72%

0.76

0.0097%

6,785

86.28%

0.78

0.0099%

-0.0002%

FE5 (9)

8,230

19.24%

996

12.10%

0.70

0.0086%

7,234

87.90%

0.83

0.0101%

-0.0016%

Row (5)-(6)

3.96%*

5.38%**

-5.38%**

Row (5)-(8)

3.76%*

5.10%**

-5.10%**
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Table 2.4 Propensity of earnings announcement issuance
This table reports the results of an ordered probit regression of the lottery-type stock indicator on earnings surprise quintiles. The
dependent variable is FE_QRank, a rank variable that represents earnings surprise quintiles and takes values between 1 and 5.
Specifically, FE_QRank=5 when the forecast error ranks in the highest earnings surprise quintile, i.e. extremely good news.
FE_QRank=1when the forecast error value ranks in the lowest earnings surprise quintile, i.e. extremely bad news. We measure
earnings surprise as FEi,q= (Ei,q– Fi,q)/Pi,q, where Ei,q is the actual earnings per share announced in quarter q for firm i, Fi,q is the
median of the most recent forecasts from all individual analysts covering the stock, and P i,q is the stock price of firm i five
trading days before the announcement in quarter q. Column1 reports the full sample test. Subsample tests are performed from
Column 2 and 3 for top- and bottom-"LSLI-Index" terciles. Both industry and time dummies are included, but coefficient
estimates are omitted for brevity. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics calculated using robust standard errors adjusted by
heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level. ***, **, * indicate a two-tailed test significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10%,
respectively.

Earnings Surprise Quintile (FE)

Lottery

Full Sample

T3(Highest )

T1(Lowest)

(1)

(2)

(3)

-0.051*

-0.065*

-0.025

(-1.78)

(-1.85)

(-0.72)

Log(Size)

0.127***

0.133***

0.174**

(4.00)

(3.48)

(2.28)

Log(BM)

-0.157***

-0.010

-0.024

(-4.52)

(-0.72)

(-0.45)

Turnover

-0.082

-0.089*

-0.248**

(-1.23)

(-1.74)

(-2.10)

Leverage

-0.431***

0.611***

-1.136***

(-10.11)

(4.36)

(-6.99)

0.041

0.062

0.451**

(0.90)

(0.36)

(2.41)

Observations

44,257

14,307

14,450

Pseudo R-squared

0.071

0.164

0.098

Industry Dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Time Dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Constant
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Table 2.5 PEAD trading strategy
This table presents the regression results of daily returns of our arbitrage portfolio on several risk factors. The trading strategy is
to long all lottery-type stocks with good news (FE5) and short all lottery-type stocks with bad news (FE1) on each trading days of
each ToM period, then hold the portfolio for 20 days. The same strategy is repeated in Column (2) and (3) except that we only
include the portfolio of lottery-type stocks in areas of highest tercile of LSLI-Index Column (2) and that we only include the
portfolio of lottery-type stocks in areas of lowest tercile of LSLI-Index in Column (3). MKT (Market Risk), SMB (Small Minus
Big) , HML (High Minus Low), MOM (Momentum) are risk factors in the four-factor model.***, **, * indicate a two-tailed test
significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.

VARIABLES
Market
SMB
HML
MOM
Constant (α)
Observations
Adj. R-squared

Full Sample
(1)

Portfolio Returns (%)
T3(Highest)
T1(Lowest)
(2)
(3)

0.026*
(1.87)
0.014**
(2.14)
-0.088
(-0.68)
0.041**
(2.49)
0.055*
(1.68)

0.029*
(1.72)
0.027**
(2.04)
-0.079
(-0.78)
0.045*
(1.84)
0.059**
(2.04)

0.036**
(2.27)
0.018
(1.33)
-0.140**
(-2.11)
-0.055
(-1.27)
0.024
(0.67)

7,905
0.205

7,905
0.277

7,905
0.252
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Table 2.6 Market reaction to SEO announcement at the ToM: Univariate tests
This table presents average cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) across two event windows from day 0 to day 1 around announcements of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) and
from day 2 to day 22 after the announcements for both lottery firms and rest of the firms at the ToM. The market model with returns from trading day − 250 to trading day − 11 are
used to estimate CARs. ***, **, * indicate a mean difference t-test significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.

All

Lottery (1)

Nonlottery & Other (2)

Difference (1) - (2)

High LSLI

Low LSLI

N

CAR(0,1)

CAR(2,22)

N

CAR(0,1)

CAR(2,22)

N

CAR(0,1)

CAR(2,22)

212

-2.23%***

-0.89**

73

-1.97%***

-1.26**

68

-2.51%***

-0.76**

(-8.59)

(2.23)

(5.67)

(2.23)

(-13.47)

(2.01)

-2.47%***

-0.84***

-2.31%***

-0.94***

-2.38%***

-0.69**

(-10.27)

(3.87)

(-12.75)

(3.87)

(-15.33)

(2.33)

0.24%

0.05%

0.34%**

-0.32%*

-0.13%

0.07%

(0.78)

(0.33)

(1.99)

(1.82)

(0.67)

(0.20)

877

284

89

298

Table 2.7 Market reaction to SEO announcement at the ToM: Multivariate tests
This table presents ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of the market reaction to the ToM SEO of lottery firms and the rest
of firms. The dependent variable in Column 1-3 (4-6) is the two-day (twenty-one-day) CARs of firms who issue SEO
announcements. Column 1 and 4 present results for the whole sample. Columns 2-3 and 4-5 present results of SEO firms that are
from top- and bottom-"LSLI-Index" terciles for difference event windows. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics calculated
using robust standard errors adjusted by heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level. ***, **, * indicate a two-tailed test
significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.

CAR (0,+1)

CAR (+2,+22)

Full Sample

T3(Highest )

T1(Lowest)

Full Sample

T3(Highest )

T1(Lowest)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

-0.008

0.021*

-0.012

-0.006

-0.015*

-0.009

(-1.28)

(1.93)

(-0.72)

(-0.87)

(-1.73)

(-1.11)

Log(Size)

-0.080

-0.079

-0.174**

-0.016*

-0.028**

-0.155*

(-1.08)

(-1.05)

(-2.28)

(-1.81)

(-2.11)

(-1.78)

Log(BM)

-0.078**

-0.064**

-0.024

-0.124

-0.102

-0.033

(-2.03)

(-2.20)

(-0.45)

(-0.62)

(-1.20)

(-0.58)

-0.011

0.023

-0.248**

-0.141***

0.133*

-0.075

(-0.51)

(0.54)

(-2.10)

(3.46)

(1.84)

(-1.08)

0.068

0.025

-1.136***

0.274**

0.156

-0.874**

(0.48)

(0.88)

(-6.99)

(2.02)

(1.42)

(-1.97)

0.011*

0.015

0.012

0.229**

0.085

0.074

(1.83)

(0.11)

(0.48)

(2.21)

(0.46)

(0.78)

Observations

1,089

407

310

1,089

407

310

R-squared

0.171

0.084

0.098

0.134

0.128

0.133

Industry Dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Time Dummies

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Lottery

Turnover

Leverage

Constant
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Table 2.8 SEO trading strategies
This table presents the regression results of daily returns of our arbitrage portfolio on several risk factors. The trading strategy is
to short all lottery-type stocks that issue SEO announcements at the ToM and long other stocks that issue SEO announcements at
the ToM on each trading days of each ToM period, then hold the portfolio until the until the end of the non-ToM period of the
next month. The same strategy is repeated in Column (2) and (3) except that we only include the portfolio of lottery-type stocks
in areas of highest tercile of LSLI-Index Column (2) and that we only include the portfolio of lottery-type stocks in areas of
lowest tercile of LSLI-Index in Column (3). MKT (Market Risk), SMB (Small Minus Big) , HML (High Minus Low), MOM
(Momentum) are risk factors in the four-factor model.***, **, * indicate a two-tailed test significance level at the 1%, 5% and
10%, respectively.

Portfolio Returns (%)
Full Sample

T3(Highest)

T1(Lowest)

(1)

(2)

(3)

Market

0.123**

0.077**

0.105***

-1.99

-2.11

-2.77

SMB

0.300**

0.158*

0.124*

-2.04

-1.69

-1.75

-0.156*

0.099*

-0.045

(-1.93)

(-1.80)

(-1.03)

0.013

-0.017

0.042*

-0.96

(-0.55)

-1.88

0.019

0.033*

0.008

-1.08

-1.75

-0.41

Observations

7,905

7,905

7,905

Adj. R-squared

0.023

0.042

0.067

VARIABLES

HML

MOM

Constant (α)
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Table 2.9 Summary statistics of SEOs by offer method

This table reports the number of marketed and accelerated offers by stock types over the sample period 1980-2010. We
report number of SEOs by type of stock (i.e. lottery vs. all others) of two choices of offering method (i.e. fully
marketed vs. accelerated) that occur at the turn of month. SEO, as well as offer choice data are from SDC. Fully
marketed offer typically involves underwriter’s marketing efforts and a road show. Accelerated offer, on the other hand,
typically does not have a road show and can be completed much faster.

All
Type of Stocks

Fully marketed

Accelerated

Difference

N

Percent

N

Percent

N

Percent

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

All

8739

100%

7565

100%

1174

100%

Lottery at non-ToM

1283

14.68%

1105

14.61%

178

15.16%

0.56%

Nonlottery & Other at non-ToM

6367

72.86%

5577

73.72%

790

67.29%

6.43%

Lottery at ToM

212

2.43%

153

2.02%

59

5.03%

3.01%**

Nonlottery & Other at ToM

877

10.04%

766

10.13%

111

9.45%

-0.67%
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(6)-(4)

Table 2.10 Propensity to issue accelerated offer
The dependent variable in the binomial logistic model is a dummy variable for which accelerated offers equal one, and zero
otherwise. The main independent variable is Lottery_issuer_ToM, which equals one if the issuer is characterized as lottery-type
firm and issue at the ToM, and zero otherwise. Demand elasticity measure is defined as the ratio between the absolute value of
the stock’s raw return and its turnover. We follow Gao and Ritter (2010) to construct other control variables such as market
capitalization(the market capitalization of equity (in millions) on the last day prior to the announcement of the offer for the share
class that is being issued), proceeds (the total amount raised), relative offer size (offered shares divided by shares outstanding
prior to the issue), fraction of primary shares(primary shares divided by the total number of shares), analysts (the number of
analysts following the issuer’s stock). ***, **, * indicate a two-tailed test significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.

Accelerated offer dummy

VARIABLES

Lottery_issuer_ToM

Ln(MV)

Ln(proceeds)

Fraction of primary shares

Relative offer size

Ln(1+analysts)

Detrended Ln(bid-ask spread)

Ln (Elasticity)

Full Sample

T3(Highest)

T1(Lowest)

(1)

(2)

(3)

0.245*

0.321*

-0.178

(1.90)

(1.84)

(-0.44)

0.294*

0.443*

0.483**

(1.84)

(1.87)

(2.01)

-0.026*

-0.014**

-0.022

(-1.67)

(-2.14)

(-1.08)

1.864***

1.573***

2.014*

(2.84)

(3.06)

(1.73)

-0.163**

-2.542*

-2.875**

(-2.33)

(-1.68)

(-1.99)

0.633

0.410

0.337

(1.01)

(1.09)

(0.87)

0.684**

0.552*

0.062

(2.00)

(1.68)

(0.36)

-0.75*

-1.052**

-0.168**

(-1.70)

(-1.99)

(-2.48)

Number of SEOs

8739

2957

3030

R-squared

0.154

0.185

0.147
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